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Abstract
Online Social Networks (OSNs), especially Twitter and Facebook, are becoming an
integral part of peoples daily life around the world. People share their activities in
OSNs, at the same time, view updates from friends. However, the popularity of OSNs
also attracts spammers. Different to Email spam, OSN spam is more challenging due
to its short content and streaming characteristic.
In this thesis, we firstly carry out an in-depth analysis Twitter Spam via various
aspects, such as deceptive information and three new “smart” spamming strategies.
Twitter spam contains deceptive information, such as free voucher and weight loss
advertisement to at- tract the interest of victims. A comprehensive analysis on the
deceptive information will be of great benefit to the detection of Twitter spam. The
analysis is based on a collection of over 550 million tweets with around 6% spam. We
find that various deceptive content of spam performs differently in luring victims to
malicious sites. We also find the regional response rate to various Twitter spam out-
breaks vary greatly. In addition, we find that spammers are becoming more crafty.
They now use more complex spamming strategies to avoid being detected. We find
three new spamming strategies, i.e. “coordinated posting”, “finite-state machine
based spam template” and “passive spam”.
The focus of recent works is on the application of machine learning techniques
into Twitter spam detection. However, tweets are retrieved in a streaming way, and
Twitter provides the Streaming API for developers and researchers to access public
tweets in real-time. There lacks of a performance evaluation of existing machine
learning based streaming spam detection methods. In the second work, we bridged
xv
the gap by carrying out a performance evaluation, which was from three different
aspects of data, feature and model. For timely spam detection, we further extracted 12
lightweight features for tweet representation. Spam detection was then transformed to
a binary classification problem in the feature space and can be solved by conventional
machine learning algorithms. We evaluated the impact of different factors to the spam
detection performance, which included spam to non-spam ratio, feature discretization,
training data size, data sampling, time-related data, and machine learning algorithms.
The results show the streaming spam tweet detection is still a big challenge and a
robust detection technique should take into account the three aspects of data, feature
and model.
In the third, we observe that the statistical properties of spam tweets vary over
time, and thus the performance of existing machine learning based classifiers will
decrease. This issue is referred to as Twitter Spam Drift. In order to tackle this
problem, we propose a novel Lfun scheme. Lfun can discover changed spam tweets
from unlabelled tweets and incorporate them into classifiers training process. A num-
ber of experiments are performed to evaluate the proposed scheme. The results show
that our proposed Lfun scheme can significantly improve the spam detection accu-
racy to detect spam tweets. The results show that our proposed Lfun scheme can
significantly improve the spam detection accuracy in real-world scenarios.
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs), like Twitter and Facebook, have become increasingly
popular in the last few years. Internet users spend more hours on social network sites
than any other website [64]. In addition, social network sites have become the main
news source for around 30% of Americans according to the survey carried out by Pew
Research Center [84]. Moreover, the social networking apps in smartphones make
users’ access to such sites become ubiquitous (nearly one of five smartphone owners
visit social networking sites via their mobile phones [35]). Billions of users spend vast
time in OSNs making friends with people who they are familiar with or interested in.
After the relation is built, users can receive messages, usually something interesting
or recent activities shared by the friends they are connected to, in the terms of tweets,
wall posts or status updates.
These connected users and information they shared form a huge social graph with
tremendous information spreading in it. These large social networks have attracted
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many researchers’ interest. Jon Kleinberg et. al focus on the analysis of social search
and social graph [59,69,97,117,118], while some researchers are measuring the online
social networks [25, 64, 82, 87]. At the same time, Neil et al. are researching on
predicting links [6, 47, 70] and inference attributes in OSNs [81, 83, 105, 138]. Privacy
preserving in social network is also a stream [53, 63, 73, 109, 120]. Moreover, sybil
attack in OSNs is also studied by researchers [124, 125, 139]. In the consideration
of studying group behaviour of users in OSNs, the community discovery techniques
are in research [56, 71, 100, 130]. In addition, some works are on the credibility [20,
23] and dissemination [7, 26, 132] of information. More interestingly, some research
are analysing users’ sentiment [14, 15, 60], predicting flu trend [2], or even detecting
earthquake in OSNs [101], etc.
Despite the interest of researchers, the rich information in OSNs has also attracted
the attention of cyber-criminals. For example, worms and malware started to spread
via OSNs [94, 115]. Such worms in OSNs are using old ideas to apply in the new
platforms. Online social network worms make use of victim’s friends’ list to send
themselves to other OSN users, which is similar to email worms like LoveLetter [24].
In addition, [12] demonstrated that it was pretty easy for cyber-criminals to launch
an automatic attack to steal the detailed information of a victim’s friends by forging a
same account of the victim. The stolen information is very invaluable for attackers to
spread malware or scams, and personalize victims’ online behaviour. Coincidentally,
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social bots, which is analogous to network bots [1], also begin to compromise the
OSNs [16,32,85,86]. Except these threats, some users are making use of the properties
of OSNs to abuse the platforms. A number of politically-motivated attacks have
occurred over the past few years. These attacks aim to either mislead public opinion,
disseminate false information, or disrupt the conversations of legitimate users [74,96,
113, 126]. Besides these attacks, URL shortening services are also abused in OSNs
[5, 31]. Among all the abuse, online social network spam, which are driving victims
to click malicious URLs containing phishing, malware, scams et al., are abusing and
polluting these platforms the most.
Why are OSNs so susceptible to spam? To answer this question, characteristics
of OSNs must studied. Firstly, information access and sharing are based on the
trust between users. Users normally share personal information in OSNs with public
access or not. If it is not public, only friends can view his information. However, the
authentication of OSNs is not that strong, which makes it very easy for attacker to
impersonate a user, forge his identity and enter this victim’s network of trust [12,51].
In addition, users often accept any friend invitation from strangers so as to gain
popularity, which may exposure their personal information to malicious users with
ulterior motives. A national survey in the U.S. carried out by Harris Interactive
showed that at least 83% of social network users received unwanted (unsolicited)
friend invitation or spam message in the year of 2008 [54]. Users’ security awareness
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to threat is also another important characteristic of OSNs. While most users are
aware of common Internet threats, they, unfortunately, are not that understanding
the hidden threats of social spam. A research study [12] illustrates that approximate
45% of users in OSNs would click the links shared by their social friends, even if they
don’t know the “friends” in real world. In addition, Chris et al. believed that social
spam are much more harmful than email spam, with a clickthrough rate of 0.13%,
compared to a much lower rate (0.0003% - 0.0006%) for email spam [48]. Social
spammers make use of these features to spread spam messages, whose embedded links
will lure victims to the sites that are promoting adult content, malware downloading,
advertisements and scams.
In this thesis, we take Twitter as the representative of Online Social Networks, and
characterise Twitter spam which is defined as unsolicited tweets containing malicious
links that directs victims to external sites containing malware downloads, phishing,
drug sales, or scams, etc [27] , evaluate spam detection algorithms, and address “Spam
Drift” issue in following chapters.
1.1 Analysing and Understanding Twitter spam
To begin with, we firstly investigate deceptive information in Twitter spam. What is
deceptive information? Spammers always leverage some certain topics, such as “free
gift card”, “gain followers”, etc., to entice victims to click the embedded malicious
4
link. This kind of information is regarded as “Deceptive Information” in Twitter
spam. A better understanding of deceptive information is crucial to spam detection
techniques. Therefore, we are motivated to thoroughly study the deceptive infor-
mation employed by spammers. To study this problem, we collect over 550 million
tweets, with 33 million of which are spam tweets. We then cluster the spam tweets
into 17 groups according to their content. These 17 groups accounted for 75% of the
spam we identified.
By examining the clickthrough data, we find that various deceptive information
of spam performs differently in luring victims to malicious sites. In addition, the
regional distribution of victims varies due to different types of deceptive information.
However, most victims are come from the United States. Our findings reveal that
different deceptive information has different click through rates in various countries.
This suggests the spam detection system should pay more attention to the tweets
that contain the deceptive information mentioned before, as detection efficiency will
be greatly improved.
We continue to study the spammers behaviours and expect to see what spammers
will do after researchers and companies have proposed a variety of spam detection
techniques. Interestingly, we have found that spammers are also becoming more crafty
to avoid being detected. They now use more complex spamming strategies. We have
identified three new spamming strategies through carrying our an in-depth analysis,
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i.e. “coordinated posting”, “finite-state machine based spam template” and “passive
spam”.
1.2 Evaluating ML-based Streaming Spam Detec-
tion Algorithms
In order to stop spammers, researchers have proposed a number of mechanisms. The
focus of recent works is on the application of machine learning techniques into Twitter
spam detection. However, tweets are retrieved in a streaming way, and Twitter
provides the Streaming API for developers and researchers to access public tweets in
real-time. There lacks of a performance evaluation of existing machine learning based
streaming spam detection methods.
In this work, we bridged the gap by carrying out a performance evaluation, which
was from three different aspects of data, feature and model. For real-time spam
detection, we further extracted 12 lightweight features for tweet representation. Spam
detection was then transformed to a binary classification problem in the feature space
and can be solved by conventional machine learning (ML) algorithms. We evaluated
the impact of different factors to the spam detection performance, which included
spam to non-spam ratio, feature discretization, training data size, data sampling,
time-related data, and machine learning algorithms. The results show the streaming
spam tweet detection is still a big challenge and a robust detection technique should
6
take into account the three aspects of data, feature and model.
1.3 Addressing “Spam Drift”: Lfun approach
Most of Twitter spam detection works rely on machine learning based techniques.
In our labelled tweets dataset, however, we observe that the statistical properties of
spam tweets vary over time, and thus the performance of existing machine learning
based classifiers decreases. This issue is referred to as “Twitter Spam Drift”. In order
to tackle this problem, we firstly carry out a deep analysis on the statistical features of
one million spam tweets and one million non-spam tweets, and then propose a novel
Lfun (Learning from unlabelled tweets) scheme. It incorporates two components:
Learning from Detected Tweets, and Learning from Human Labelling. The proposed
scheme can discover “changed” spam tweets from unlabelled tweets and incorporate
them into classifier’s training process. A number of experiments are performed to
evaluate the proposed scheme. The results show that our proposed Lfun scheme can
significantly improve the spam detection accuracy in real-world scenarios.
1.4 Contributions
Spam is plaguing Twitter now. In addition, it entices much more victims than email
spam [44]. Spam not only interferes user experience, but also causes damage to users,
such as malware downloading, phishing, worm propagation, etc. Understanding and
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detecting Twitter spam is of great urgency and importance.
In order to achieve it, this thesis firstly provide a through data analysis of spam on
Twitter. We demonstrate that various deceptive content of spam performs differently
in luring victims to malicious sites and the regional response rate to various Twitter
spam outbreaks varies greatly. In addition, spammers are becoming “smarter” by
employing more complex spamming strategies to avoid being detected. We then
carry out a performance evaluation of streaming spam detection frameworks, which
was from three different aspects of data, feature and model. From that, we therefore
identified an unseen issue in Twitter spam detection, i.e. “Spam Drift”. To address
this problem, we propose a Lfun scheme, which can learn from unlabelled tweets.
Experiments on real-world datasets show that our scheme can greatly improve the
detection accuracy. Our contributions of this thesis is summarised as:
• We have collected and labelled a large Twitter data set of around 600 million
tweets. After analysing it, we find various deceptive information of spam per-
forms differently in luring victims to malicious sites. In addition, the regional
distribution of victims varies due to different types of deceptive information.
This suggests the spam detection system could leverage the deceptive informa-
tion contained in spam tweets to improve detection efficiency. We have also
identified three new spamming strategies applied by spammers, which indicates
that spammers are also fighting back to avoid being detected. Researchers and
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industry should pay more attention to spammers’ behaviour, and propose ad-
vanced detection systems.
• Research community lacks of a performance evaluation of existing machine
learning based streaming spam detection methods. We, thus, evaluate the im-
pact of different factors to performance the streaming spam detection, which
include spam to non-spam ratio, feature discretization, training data size, data
sampling, time-related data, and machine learning algorithms. The importance
of this work is to show that the streaming spam tweet detection is still a big
challenge and a robust detection technique should take into account the three
aspects of data, feature and model.
• We firstly identify the “Spam Drift” issue in detecting Twitter spam. We then
propose a Lfun scheme which can discover “changed” spam tweets from unla-
belled tweets and incorporate them into classifier’s training process. Our Lfun
scheme can effectively detect spam tweets even when they are drifting. Cur-
rent Twitter spam detection systems can take advantage of our work to further
improve their accuracy.
The importance of our work is two-fold. On one hand, the in-depth analysis shed
light on that researchers can leverage context information and spammers’ behaviour
to propose advanced high accurate detection system. On the other hand, researchers
also need consider “Spam Drift” issue when they are designing detection systems.
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Our proposed Lfun scheme can provide industries an opportunity to re-design their
system to wipe as much spam as possible.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews recent state-of-art works
on spam analysis and characterisation, and spam detection mechanisms. Chapter 3
shows our findings on deceptive information contained in Twitter spam and emerging
spamming strategies developed by spammers to avoid being detected. A thorough
performance evaluation on machine learning based spam detection, from three differ-
ent aspects of data, feature and model is carried in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 identifies a
new “Spam Drift” issue and provides a solution which learns from unlabelled tweets to
solve this issue. Finally Chapter 6 concludes this thesis, and future research directions
are pointed out.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, related works will be introduced as two parts, OSN spam characteri-
sation and state-of-art spam detection techniques.
2.1 Spam Characterization in OSNs
Spam messages are flooding in the OSNs, analysing and understanding of spam should
be studied before detection. The following works in this section are focusing on the
characterization of spam in OSNs.
2.1.1 Analysing Spam with Blacklisted URLs
[48] analysed 25 million URLs from 200 million public tweets, which was collect within
one month. After flagging using three blacklists (Google Safebrowsing, URIBL, and
Joewein), 3 million tweets are identified as spam. 2 million URLs are regarded as
spam (5% of them were malware and phishing and the rest 95% directing victims to
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scams), which accounts for 8% of all crawled unique URLs. However, 26% of URLs
are directing to spam after they did a manual inspection of a sampled dataset, which
indicates that the performance of blacklisting was moderate. They also found that
the URLs in the spam messages would be blacklisted after they existed for 4 to 20
days. Nevertheless, 90% victims visited the spam URLs within the first two days
of posting. Consequently, blacklists lag-time is too long to prevent the victims from
visiting spam URLs. In addition, researchers believed that only 16% spam accounts
are fraudulent accounts (which are create explicitly for spamming purpose), and 84%
are compromised accounts. By studying the clickthrough of spam campaigns, twitter
spam are much more harmful than email spam, with a clickthrogh rate of 0.13%,
compared to a much lower rate (0.0003% - 0.0006%) for email spam.
2.1.2 Analysing Suspended Accounts on Twitter
As previous study [48] showed that URL blacklists would miss a large proportion of
spam (8% detected by blacklisting, but 26% spam were found by manual inspection),
[114] relied on Twitters own detection algorithm to build the ground truth. They
collected a dataset of 1.8 billion tweets (sent by 32.9 million accounts in the period
of 7 months), with 80 million (from the 1.1 million accounts suspended by Twitter)
are spam. Nearly 3.3% accounts in the dataset are suspended by twitter. After
validating sampled 100 suspended accounts, researchers found that majority accounts
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are fraudulent ones instead of compromised ones, which is opposite to [1, 2]. With
deep exploration, Twitters own detection algorithm can only catch 37% of spam
accounts. More interestingly, 77% spam accounts are suspended within one day of
their first tweet and 92% spam accounts only last within 3 days. Under such pressure,
89% spam accounts are rarely setting up social connections with users (they require
less than 10 followers). Instead, 52% accounts make use of unsolicited mention and
17% accounts are hijacking trending topics. In addition, they also studied five large
spam campaigns. However, three of them direct victims to reputable online shopping
such as Amazon, which blurs the line what constitutes spam on social networks.
In [129], Wei et al. explore the spatial patterns of suspended Twitter users (mainly
spammers) to see whether the network structure is impacted or not after removing
such users. Authors collected about 74 million tweets sent by 38 million users from
April 2010 to November 2013. They evaluate the impact of network structure from
these aspects, node and edge statistics, network metrics and metrics ranking of net-
work members. In addition, the impact of of content and sentiment is analysed. They
conclude that the removal of suspended accounts has significant impact on influential
users and overall topology of mentions, but less impact on what is being talked.
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2.1.3 Characterising Spam Campaigns in OSNs
Different to work [48, 114], [44] focuses on the spam in Facebook. By crawling 8
regional networks in Facebook, they retrieved about 187 million message (wall post)
from 3.5 million users. Firstly, researchers wanted to detect the users who were
spreading the spam. Each wall post is modelled as a ¡description, URL¿ pair, two
posts are regarded as similar if they 1) share the similar description or 2) share
the same URL. All posts containing URLs are clustered according to the similarity.
Malicious clusters are identified by distributed property (the number of users send
wall posts in the cluster) and busty property (the absolute time interval between
consecutive wall posts). If multiple accounts are sending similar messages or many
messages are sent in a short period of time, these clusters are more likely to be spam
campaigns. A threshold of (5, 1.5 hr) is used to detect suspicious clusters after initial
experiments. Secondly, they began to characterize the identified spam campaigns.
Three major spam campaigns are: 1) spammers promise free gifts; 2) spammers
trigger victims curiosity by saying someone has a crush on you; 3) spammers describe
some products. They also found that 70.3% spam posts directing victims to phishing
sites and 35.1% spam posts lead to malware downloading, which is much different
to [1], with only 5% spam direct to phishing and malware. Surprisingly, 97% of
accounts which are distributing spam are compromised rather than being created by
spammers. They also found that around 80% malicious accounts are lasing for less
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than one hour and only 10% can be active for more than one day, after analysing the
accounts behaviours. In addition, malicious accounts are most active at 3 am. These
two facts can suggest that most malicious accounts are compromised accounts which
are originally legitimate ones.
2.1.4 Analysing Spammers’ Ecosystem
[136] focuses on the analysis of cyber-criminal ecosystem which is composed of crimi-
nal account community and criminal supporters community in Twitter. By analysing
the sampled criminal account community of 2060 accounts, they find that the inner
social relationship of this community is like this: 1) criminal accounts are forming a
small world and 2) criminal hubs are more inclined to follow criminal accounts. In
order to analyse the outer relationship, authors implemented an Mr.SPA algorithm
(malicious relevance score to measure how closely an account to criminal accounts) to
extract 5924 supporters, mainly formed by 3 categories: social butterflies (who have
large number of followings and followers), social promoters (who have large following-
follower ratios to promote their products), and dummies (most likely controlled by
criminal accounts). By realizing that checking on each account deeply to determine
whether it is a criminal account is impractical, researchers proposed a Criminal Ac-
counts Inference Algorithm to infer more criminal accounts by exploiting criminal
accounts social relationships and semantic coordination. This algorithm is based on
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these observations: 1) criminal accounts tend to be socially connected and 2) criminal
accounts usually share similar accounts. CIA algorithm can infer a large portion of
criminal accounts from a small built social graph of known criminals.
Table 2.1 briefly describes the methods, datasets and analysed platforms of the
above approaches.
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Works Method Datasets Platform
Grier et al. [48] URL Blacklisting 3 million spam tweets
collected from Jan,
2010 to Feb, 2010
Twitter
Gao et al. [44] Grouping by similar
message or URL, then
classify using bursting
nature and diverse of
accounts
187 million wall posts,
including 212,863 spam
sent by 57,000 accounts
from Jan, 2008 to June,
2009
Facebook
Thomas et al. [114] Nil 1.1 million suspended
accounts by Twitter
from 17 April 2010 to
4 March 2010
Twitter
Yang et al. [136] Malicious Score calcu-
lated by CIA algorithm
2060 detected spam-
mers in [137]
Twitter
Wei et al. [129] Gussian mixture mod-
elling
78 Million tweets from
38 million users in the
range of April 2010 to
November 2013
Twitter
Table 2.1: Platforms and Datasets used in Characterization Works
2.2 State-of-art Spam Detection Techniques in OSNs
This section provides the detailed review of existing state-of-art social spam detection
techniques, based on three categories, URL features based, statistical features based,
and text based.
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2.2.1 URL Features Based Techniques
As spammers always embed URLs in the spam messages to lure people to the sites
which may contain hidden threats, a number of works focused on the detection of
URLs contained in the messages to determine whether this message is spam or not.
Similar to previous works [55, 75–77] to detect malicious URLs, the reviewed works
also applied machine learning on detecting the suspicious spam messages.
2.2.1.1 Real-time URL Spam Filtering in Twitter
Some works focused on the characteristics of spammers accounts to detect social
spam. However, this kind of approach has two drawbacks: 1) delay occurs between
the account creation and detection due to requirement of collecting history behaviour;
2) compromised accounts are not accurately detected due to its mixed behaviours of
benign and malicious accounts. In [112], Thomas et al. designed a system named
Monarch, which can detect whether a URL directs to spam content. This system
contains three components: a crawler to collect URLs from social media, a feature
extractor to visit crawled URLs and extract relevant features, and a classification en-
gine to classify the URLs. Authors used Web Browser, DNS resolver, and IP analysis
to collect a number of features from URLs captured by email providers spam traps,
blacklisted URLs appearing in Twitter and non-spam URLs in Twitter. Features
include domain tokens, path tokens, redirects, JavaScript events and so on. In order
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to fast train the large-scale datasets, authors applied a stochastic gradient descent for
logistic regression. The experimental results show that their system can identify spam
with 90.78% accuracy and 0.87% false positives; the classification time is around 6
seconds per instance. They also noted that twitter spamming activities are different
from email spamming ones, which indicates that there is no common set of features
that can discriminate both spamming activities.
This work [67] provides a real-time Twitter suspicious URL detection system based
on the correlations of multiple URL redirect chains that share the same redirection
severs. Due to the easy fabrication of account based features and lexical URL features,
authors investigated the features extracted from correlated URL redirection chains. If
several URL redirection chains share one same intermediate URL (which is call entry
point), they are regarded as Correlated URL Redirection Chains. A total number of
14 features are extracted from correlated URL redirection Chains and Tweet context
information. The classifier was implemented by using an L2-Regularized L1-loss sup-
port vector classification (SVC) algorithm, and the accuracy was 91.87% with 1.13%
FP. FP could be further reduced to 0.95% if the weight value of benign samples was
set to 1.1. Authors also evaluated the discrimination of features by using F-score, and
found that the account creation time, the relative number of source applications, and
the relative number of initial URLs are import features. In contrast, the similarity
of number of friends and followers and the relative number of Twitter accounts are
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less important. However, this system cannot deal with dynamic and multiple URL
redirections as the crawler can only process HTTP headers. In addition, the system
is not able to handle all the public tweets if it has the 100% sampling access right. [68]
is an extended version of this paper.
2.2.1.2 Behaviour Analysis based Spam URL Detection on OSNs
Some works are based on the behaviour analysis of URLs, relying on the fact that
behavioural features are more difficult to manipulate than traditional features.
[21] examines the behaviour of spam URLs from two aspects: the posting be-
haviour and the clicking behaviour. Thus, they extract 15 related features, such as
posting count, posting intensity, click dynamics, total number of clicks and so on.
They then apply Random Forest on these 15 features of two datasets, and achieve
86% overall accuracy. [123] proposes BEAN to detect spam URL. After analysing
spammers’ message sending behaviour and their characteristics on Twitter, they de-
fine six URL behaviour states. Further, a Markov Chain Model is proposed to detect
spam URL. This approach has demonstrated the ability to detect spam which cannot
be identified by conventional techniques, such as SVM and TrustRank.
Table 2.2 briefly describes the methods, features, datasets and platforms of the
above approaches.
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Works Algorithm Features Datasets Platform
Thomas et
al. [112]
Logistic Regres-
sion with L1-
regularization
Source URL,
HTML headers,
. . . URL based
features
567,784 spam URLs
posted to Twitter,
1.25 million spam
URL in emails from
Sept, 2010 to Oct,
2010
Twitter and
Email
Lee et al. [67,
68]
L2-regularized L1-
loss support vector
classification
content based fea-
tures, URL redi-
rect chain based
features
263,289 accounts
suspended by
Twitter from April,
2011 to Aug, 2011
Twitter
Cao et
al. [21]
Random Forest 15 URL based
features from post-
ing and clicking
behaviour
7 million Bitly-
shortened URLs
posted on Twitter
Twitter
Wang et al.
[123]
Markov Chain
Model
6 URL behaviour
states
2.4 million tweets
sent by 900k users
in four months
Twitter
Table 2.2: Features and Datasets used in URL based Works
2.2.2 Machine Learning Based Techniques
Inspired by the power of machine learning algorithms, a few researchers apply ML
algorithms to detect social spam. This section reviews significant works published on
ML-based social spam detection. The key points of each work are discussed in the
following subsections and summarised in Table 2.2.2.9
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2.2.2.1 Detecting Spam by Using Meta-info Features
Benevenuto et al. in 2008 firstly applied Machine Learning to identify video spammers
on Youtube by using both user-related and video-related features [9,10]. Inspired by
this work, they later proposed a machine learning based method to detect Twitter
spammers in 2010 [8]. Although, Kuak et al. have reported twitter spam in their data,
they filtered the spam simply using some fixed thresholds [64] instead of using machine
learning algorithm. [8] was using a much larger set of both account-based features and
tweet context based features to differentiate spammers from normal users. Spammers
were defined as the users who posted at least one URL unrelated to the tweet text
in this work. A huge dataset of more than 5.4 million users, 1.9 billion links and 1.8
billion tweets were collected at first, then a labelled dataset relating to three trending
topics in 2009 were extracted. The dataset was manually labelled by volunteers, which
consisted of 335 spammers and 7852 non-spammers. A total number of 62 features
from both tweet content and account were used for the classification using SVM with
RBF kernel. It can correctly detect approximate 70% (dual behaviour of spammers
caused the misclassification of 30% spammers to non-spammers) of spammers and
96% of non-spammers. Features importance was evaluated by using information gain
and Chi-Square test. The most discriminative features were URLs in the tweet, and
the accounts age. Classifications on content-based features were also carried out,
however the FP increased to 7.5% from 3.6%.
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Wang et al. also proposed a Bayesian classifier based approach to detect spammers
on Twitter [121]. Both graph based features (an importance feature, reputation, was
included) and content-based features were used in this work. In order to train the
classifier, a number of 500 manually labelled users were used, which contained 3% of
spammers, e.g. 15 spammers after calculation. 392 out of 25817 users were detected
as spammers. 348 suspicious spammers were confirmed to be real spammers after
checking manually, with 89% precision. A limitation of this work is obvious: proposed
features are easy to be evaded. More robust features were later proposed by Yang et
al. in [135,137]
2.2.2.2 Spammer Detection by Using honeypots:
Traditional spam detection classifiers need a lot of human intelligence to manually
label a training set. In addition, the learned spam signature disappears quickly as
spammers are adopting various evasion techniques. Alternatively, some spam dis-
covery approach relies on the community reporting mechanism (like User S was
reported by some other users as spammers). This method, however, can be ma-
nipulated themselves to mistakenly label legitimate users to spammers. In security
community, researchers often deploy honey pots to observe and analyse malicious ac-
tivities [61, 93, 106]. Inspired by this, authors in work [66, 107] used honeypots (also
called honey profile) to collect spammers in OSNs.
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After collecting a number of spammers profiles, Lee et al. used an updated clas-
sifier to detect spammers [66]. The deployed honeypots collected 1570 spammers
profiles and 500 spammers profiles for MySpace and Twitter respectively. Four kinds
of features were used for classification: user demographics, user-contributed content,
user activity features and user connections. The evaluation of the spam detection was
using 10 supervised classifiers from WEKA. The accuracy was above 98% for MyS-
pace dataset, and ranged from 82% to 88% for Twitter dataset. It proved that the
deployed social honeypots could attract spammers whose behaviours were strongly
discriminative from normal users. In addition, authors also evaluated the effectiveness
of large-scale spam detection by using two large datasets: 1.5m profiles in MySpace,
and 215,345 user profiles with 4,040,415 tweets in Twitter. (Evaluations were done
on sampled small datasets as well)The precision was worse for MySpace, decreasing
from 98% to around 70%, but Twitters stayed the same.
Similar to [66], Stringhini et al. in [107] deployed 900 honeypots in Facebook,
MySpace and Twitter like [66]. These honeypots would accept any friend request
from strangers. After monitoring for around one year, they manually identified 173
spammers out of 3831 requests, 8 spammers out of 22 requests, and 361 spammers
out of requests for Facebook, MySpace and Twitter respectively. According to differ-
ent spamming strategy, authors also categorize four classes of spammers: Displayer
who only displays spam content in his own profile page, Bragger who post malicious
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messages to their own profile, Poster who send messages to victims by posting on
their walls, and Whisperer who sends private message to specific victim. Six features
(the discriminative power was not examined) were extracted from these spammers. A
Random Forest classifier was used to classify spammers. A 10-fold evaluation on the
1000 profiles training set yielded 2% FP rate, and 1% FN rate for Facebook dataset.
One the other side, the same evaluation yielded FP rate of 2.5% and FN rate of 3%.
However, TP rate was not reported in this work. The analysis on the spam campaigns
demonstrated that there were two kinds of campaigns, one was stealthy campaign that
was posting mixed malicious and benign messages, the other was greedy campaign
that was posting malicious messages only and the rate was fast.
2.2.2.3 Spam Detection in Multiple OSNs
Previous spam detection works mainly focus on one particular social network. Thus,
[57] proposed a scalable and online system to deal with this critical security issue in
multiple online social networks. Three kind of users, which were spammer, legitimate
user, and infected user, were defined by authors. The goal of this system was to
detect the messages sent from both spammers and infected users. Different to other
works, this system considered detecting spam photos as well, by using image content
features such as colour histogram, colour correlation, CEDD, et al. Several features
from text content and social network characteristics were also used. After that,
existing classifier would be trained with pre-labelled samples and then to classify
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unlabelled instances. Classified instances would also be added into the training set to
re-train the classifier. It is said this framework is scalable in multiple social networks.
This demo, however, was only done in the case of Facebook; performance was not
reported. And the adaptability to other social network platforms was not shown.
In addition, Faraz et al. proposed a generic statistical approach for spam detection
in both Facebook and Twitter [3]. In this work, authors manually labelled a rela-
tively small set of normal and spam profiles from Facebook and Twitter. 165 spam
profiles and 155 normal profiles were labelled for Facebook dataset, and the Twitter
dataset contained 160 spam profiles and 145 normal profiles. 14 features from four
categories (Interaction, Messages, URLs, mentions) were extracted to represent one
sample in classification. Nave Bayes, Jrip and J48 were used as supervised classifiers;
the results were impressive with more than 95% detection rate. They also evaluate
the importance of selected features, measured using Information Gain. Several dis-
criminative features, which related to friends/followers, pages/hashtags, and URLs,
were found by the authors. Authors also clustered spammers into campaigns using
Markov clustering algorithm. However, the campaign analysis was not done. And
the generic approach might only be able to detect Facebook and Twitter spammers,
which cannot detect other social network spammers. Furthermore, the experimental
dataset was too small which cannot represent the super large online social networks.
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Xu et al. [134] also noticed that when one spam link appeared in one social net-
work, it was most likely to appear in a another social network, due to the connections
within these social networks. They believed that, if the spam detection models have
the ability to communicate with each other, it would be effective for spam filtering.
As a result, they focused on analysing and extracting spam in one social network,
and using the features to detect spam in other social networks. In this work, they
collected both Twitter and Facebook datasets. Firstly, they trained a classifier to
detect Twitter spam using Twitter dataset. Then, they mixed the Facebook data
into Twitter dataset to retrain the model and used it to detect Twitter spam as well.
After comparison among various machine learning algorithms, they concluded that
similar spam in one social network can benefit the detection of spam in another social
network.
2.2.2.4 Designing Robust Features to Fight Social Spammer
A number of previous works [8,121] has applied machine learning algorithms to detect
Twitter spammers by using discriminative features. However, some feature were eas-
ily to be evaded by buying more followers, posting more tweets, mixing normal and
spam tweets, etc. Consequently, authors in [135,137] intended to import some robust
features, including 3 graph-based features, 3 neighbour-based features, 3 automation-
based features and 1 timing-based features. Authors also built a quantitative model
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to analyse the robustness of the features, results showed that, age, betweenness cen-
trality, clustering coefficient were the most robust features. After comparing with
three similar work [66, 107, 121], this work had the lowest False Positive Rate, along
with the highest Detection Rate and F-measure. In addition, after removing the 10
new features, the detection rate would decrease about 10%. This also proved the
effectiveness of the new proposed features. The evaluation dataset was small, which
only consisted 500 spammer accounts, and 5000 non-spammer accounts. It may have
sampling bias. Furthermore, some graph-based features were also very expensive to
collect.
[122] also designs the Twitter spam detection system, which only relies on the
tweet-inherent features. The benefit of tweet-only based features can facilitate the
timely detection of spam tweets, and the extraction of such features is near real-
time. In this work, Wang et al. proposed 17 content features, such as No. of words,
Number of characters, N-gram features, and sentiment features. Based on these
features, they conducted spam detection tasks under five different machine learning
algorithms. They have achieved encouraging results when compared with existing
detection frameworks with costly features.
2.2.2.5 Social Relation Based Techniques
User account features based approaches have two significant limitations in spam de-
tection in online social networks: 1) features can be easily fabricated; 2) it has a delay
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between spam creation and detection for the reason that features cannot be collected
until numerous malicious activities are done. In order to solve these limitations, [104]
proposed a social relation feature based detection framework, which can avoid the
evasion of features by spammers and detect spam at the same time when a receiver
receives a message. They proposed two new relation features in this work: distance
and connectivity. While distance was the length of shortest path, the connectivity
was measured by min-cut and random walk. From the evaluation of distribution
of spammers and non-spammers, they found that most spam came from users at a
distance of more than three. In addition, the connectivity between spammers and
non-spammers was different from that between non-spammers. In the consideration
of measuring these two relation features, a directed subgraph G which was part of the
whole social graph G was generated under four conditions. To evaluate this method,
they crawled a dataset containing 148,371 profiles, 267,551 tweets. Finally, they got
308 spammers and 10,000 spam messages by checking with the official @spam account
which was used by users to report spam. Five supervised classifiers implemented in
Weka were tested on 10-fold cross validation. The True Positive rate of the best
classifier, Bagging, varied from 93.3% to 95.1% when using only distance and random
walk and using distance, random walk, and min-cut. Authors also imported 11 user
based features in previous works, and found that the True Positive rate was improved
up to 99.7%, while the False Positive rate was reduced to 0.5% from about 5%. The
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improvement was substantial when combing both the relation based features and user
based features. Limitations of this work include: 1) message from new user would
be classified as spam; 2) spam message from compromised users could be labelled as
benign message.
Spammers prefer to use compromised account to spread spam, as these accounts
already have well-established social connections. As a result, Egele et al. [40] and
Ruan et al. [98] proposed approaches to detect compromised accounts. Egele et al.
used statistical models to characterise seven features, Time, Message Source, Message
Text, Message Topic, Links in Message, Direct User Interaction and Proximity. Then,
authors leverage anomaly detection techniques to identify sudden changes in users’
behaviour. This approach can effectively detect compromisation in accounts in Social
Networks. Ruan et al [98] noticed that, although spammers can hack legitimate users’
accounts, they cannot easily mimic the users’ social behaviour patterns as spammers
know little about those hacked users. In addition, spammers tend to use accounts
to massively distribute spam messages, while legitimate users tend to entertain with
friends. This lead more difficulty for spammers to mimic legitimate users’ behaviour.
Thus, it is possible to detect account compromisation by checking the compliance
of the account’s new behaviour with the authentic patterns. After analysing users’
clickstream behaviour, [98] proposed some new social behaviour features to quantify
the users’ difference. By converting these features into eight vectors, they firstly
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calculated the Euclidean distance vector, and then a user’s behaviour was modelled
as the mean difference between each pair of profiles. When the behaviour profile
diverges, compromised activity can be detected. Their evaluation on Facebook users
achieved high accuracy detection of compromised accounts
2.2.2.6 Spam Campaign Detection on OSNs
Account based spam detection is not sufficient to fight the spamming activities in
online social networks, since adversaries were using compromised accounts to spread
spam [44, 48]. The long latency and low efficiency in [48] and [44] prevent their us-
ability for online detection. Consequently, authors in [43] proposed a campaign based
technology which was capable to detect spam online. Instead of directly inspecting
each single message, authors grouped incoming messages into campaigns based on
similar text or same embedded URL. Similar texts were determined if the resem-
blance score (defined as the ratio of shared shingles to all unique shingles) of them is
0.5. For an incoming message, it firstly created a cluster which only contained itself.
Then all clusters that had the similar message should be found and merged with the
new cluster (called incremental clustering by authors).After that, features were ex-
tracted from the formed clusters. Despite general features like, Cluster Size, Average
Time Interval, Average URL Number per Message, and Unique URL Number, au-
thors also proposed two OSN specific features: Sender Social Degree and Interaction
History. At last a trained supervised classifier using C4.5 Decision Tree was used for
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classification. After tuning the ratio of spam to legitimate messages, the TP rate
could reach 80.9% with 0.19% FP rate (class imbalance problem). At last, testing on
the sever confirmed the low latency (21.5ms) and high throughput (1580 message per
second), which can be deployed online (though no demo is shown).
Zhang et al. [142,143] also considered detecting promoting campaigns along with
the detection of social spam campaigns. Motivated by that current account or message
based methods cannot detect all spam at one shot, authors proposed a campaign
based detection scheme like [44]. While [44] applied similar message or same URL to
cluster campaigns, [143] used Shannon Information Theory to estimate the similarity
between two accounts. All the similar accounts were linked to form a graph, and
cohesive campaigns (defined in [127]) were extracted using the intuition in [65]. After
that, they extracted 9 features from these found campaigns. SVM with RBF kernel
was used to do the classification. The dataset used was from Tweets2011, and 844
campaigns were extracted. By carefully checking the campaigns manually, 375 regular
campaigns, 278 promoting ones and 140 spam ones were labelled. The classifier was
trained by 200 samples (out of 844, distribution was not shown), and the classification
results were good.
Xiao et al. in [133] proposed a scalable approach to detect clusters of fake accounts.
They aimed at fast detection even before the fake accounts established connections
with normal users. Their approach consisted three modules, cluster builder, profile
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featurizer and Account Scorer. Cluster builder took all accounts, and built clusters
based on IP address and date. Profile featurizer was then used to extract basic
distribution features, pattern features and frequency features. At last, account scorer
was trained and used to detect clusters of fake accounts. This system was implemented
in Java, Hive and R, and successfully detected over 250,000 fake LinkedIn accounts.
2.2.2.7 Detecting Spam and Spammers Together
The above works were either detecting spam or spammers, however, [30] proposed
a framework to jointly detect web spam and spammers at the same time, which
was called co-classification in this work. The problem of detecting web spam and
spammers was formalized to learn a pair of classifiers which can differentiate web
spam from non-spam and spammers from non-spammers accurately. Authors used
the extensions of least-square support vector machine proposed by Suykens et al. to
classify spam and spammers. The model parameters were estimated from the training
data. In order to test effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, a real-world dataset
from delicious.com was used. The whole dataset consisted of about 3 million users
and 110,000 bookmarks. They labelled the bookmarks with the URLs from spam
benchmark data in [128]; a user would be labelled as spammer if he posted to at least
one spam bookmarks. A sampled dataset contained 20,000 bookmarks and 20,000
users (spam/non-spam ration is 1/4) was used for experiments. Results showed that
F-measure of their co-classification approach was at least 5% higher than linear and
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non-linear SVM in terms of classifying both spam bookmarks and spammers. Their
work is also applicable for other social media sites where the following information is
available: links between users, links between users and their submitted web content,
and content based features derived from the web content.
Wu et al. also proposed a co-classification approach to detect spammers and
spam messages together in microblogging sites [131]. In this work, authors found
three observations which could approve that detecting spammers and spam messages
together achieves better results than performing single task. First one was user-
message relation, which indicates that spammers tend to post more messages than
legitimate users. Second one was user-user relation, which underlies that spammers
are usually followed by spammers to get collaborated. Third one was message-message
relation, which observes that massive spam messages share same topic as spammers
worked together to spread spam. Based on these three observations, authors proposed
a ADMM-based [18] model to co-detect spammers and spam message on Sina Weibo.
2.2.2.8 Detecting Spam in location-based Social Network
Despite the popularity of traditional online social networks like Facebook and Twit-
ter, Location Based Social Networks (LBSNs) are attracting users in exponential
rates. Like spamming activities in other online social networks, LBSNs also need
to deal with spammers who are posting unrelated or even malicious tip comments
about locations. Helen et al. in work [35] addressed the problem of detecting tip
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spam in Apontador that was a Brazil location based social network site. The dataset
was provided by Apontador, which contained 1260 spam tips and 1260 non-spam tips
manually labelled from 15th to 22rd September 2011. Based on the information con-
tained in the labelled dataset, authors also crawled the places information, users and
their neighbours information, which formed a weak social graph consisted of 137,464
users. They considered four feature sets (41 features in total) to differentiate the
characteristics of spam and non-spam tip, including content features, user features,
place features, and social features. A state of art algorithm in machine learning,
Random Forest, was used to detect spam tips. After running 5-fold cross validation
ten times, they obtained 0.84 TP rate and 0.918 FP rate. The experimental results
further showed that, the classification accuracy could reach 82.6%. However, the
dataset was not big enough to avoid bias as well.
2.2.2.9 Unsupervised Spam Detection
There are also some works using unsupervised method to detect social spam. [110]
proposed UNsupervised socIal networK, UNIK, which relies on the social graph. They
firstly built a social graph based on posted URLs and the connections of users. Based
on the graph, Tan et al. calculated the node degree, and flagged users as spammers
whose node degree exceeded the pre-defined threshold. This work heavily relied on
social graph and may missed some spammers who did not post URLs.
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In [119], authors used a matrix to represent users and their social behaviour fea-
tures. PCA was then used to extract the principal components from the matrix. The
top-k components represented the normal users’ behaviour, and the rest represented
anomalies. After that, authors calculated the bounds on the L2 norm. If one user’s
the L2 norm exceeded a user-defined threshold, it would be flagged as anomaly.
The previous two works need human intervention to set up an optimal threshold.
To address this shortcoming, Fathaliani et al. proposed a unsupervised scheme to au-
tomatically distinguish spammers and legitimate users [41]. They firstly constructed
a feature vector of each user to represent his behaviour and interactions with others.
Then they used Dirichlet mixture [17, 78] to create a statistical framework to model
the users’ behaviour. After estimating the probability density, the Dirichlet compo-
nents were calculated. The Dirichlet component which contains vectors with smallest
values corresponded with spammers.
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Works Algorithm Features Datasets Platform
Benevenuto
et al. [8]
SVM with
RBF kernel
39 content based
features, such as
No. of words per
tweets, No. of
URLs per works
etc. and 23 user
based features,
such as No. of
followers, No. of
followees, No. of
tweets, etc.
1065 manually
labelled users
sampled in three
trending topics:
Michael Jack-
son’s death, Susan
Boyle’s emergence,
and #musiccom-
monday from a big
crawled dataset
August 2009
Twitter
Wang et al.
[121]
Naive Bayes graph based fea-
tures, such as
No. of friends,
No. of followers,
and reputation
etc. and content
based features,
such as Duplicate
of Tweets, HTTP
Links, Replies and
Mentions, and
Trending Topics
500 manually la-
belled accounts
with 3% (15)
spammers
Twitter
continued on next page
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Works Algorithm Features Datasets Platform
Lee et al. [66] Top 10 su-
pervised
classifiers
implemented
in WEKA
(Decorate,
SimpleLo-
gistic, FT,
. . . )
user demograph-
ics: age, gender,
location, etc.; user
contributed con-
tent: “About Me”
text, posts, com-
ments, etc.; user
activity features:
posting rate, tweet
frequency ; user
connections: No.
of friends, or fol-
lowers in the social
network
1570 spammers’
profiles in MySpace
(Oct 2008 Jan
2008) and 500
spammers’ profiles
in Twitter (Aug
2009 Sept 2009)
MySpace and Twit-
ter
continued on next page
38
continued from previous page
Works Algorithm Features Datasets Platform
Stringhini et
al. [107]
Random
Forest
FF ratio, URL
ratio, Message
Similarity, Friend
Choice, Message
Sent, and Friend
Number
1000 samples
training, 790,951
profiles for detec-
tion in Facebook,
135,834 in Twitter
June 2009 June
2010
Facebook, MyS-
pace and Twitter
Ahmed et al.
[3]
Naive Bayes,
C4.5 and
JRIP
14 features from 4
categories: Interac-
tion, Post/Tweets,
URLs,
Tags/@mentions
manually labelled
320 Facebook
profiles and 302
Twitter Profiles
Facebook and
Twitter
Xu et
al. [134]
Random
Forest,
Bagging,
J48, Ran-
dom Tree,
BayesNet,
Logistic
word features 1937 spam tweets
and 10942 non-
spam tweets on
Twitter, 1338 spam
posts and 9285
non-spam posts on
Facebook
Facebook and
Twitter
Yang et al.
[135,137]
Supervised
Classifiers
(RF, DT,
BN, DE)
24 features from 6
categories: Profile
based, Content
based, Graph
based, Neighbour
based, Automation
based and Timing
based
2060 detected
spammers using
URL blacklisting
services
Twitter
continued on next page
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Works Algorithm Features Datasets Platform
Wang et al.
[122]
Naive Bayes,
KNN, SVM,
Decision
Tree, and
Random
Forest
User features, Con-
tent features, N-
gram features, and
Sentiment features
Social Honey-
pot dataset [66]
and 1KS-10KN
dataset [138]
Twitter
Song et al.
[104]
Naive Bayes,
KNN, SVM,
Decision
Tree, and
Random
Forest
distance, connec-
tivity
148,371 profiles,
267,551 tweets
Twitter
Gao et al.
[43]
C4.5 Obsolete features
used in email spam
detection, such
as message size,
network based
features, and OSN
specific features,
such as sender
social degree, inter-
action history, and
General features,
such as cluster
size, average time
interval
187 million Face-
book wall posts
(Jan 2008 June
2009) 17 million
tweets (June 2011
July 2011)
Facebook and
Twitter
continued on next page
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Works Algorithm Features Datasets Platform
Zhang et al.
[143]
SVM with
RBF kernel
Average Posting
Interval, UTNum,
UTFrequency,
URLNum, Cam-
paignDensity,
DomainNum, VU-
ratio, DTSimilar-
ity, and Blacklisted
Number
844 candidate cam-
paigns extracted
using the algorithm
in [127]
Twitter
Xiao et al.
[133]
Random
Forest,
Logistic
Regression,
SVM
Basic distribution
features, Pat-
tern features, and
Frequency features
over 500K accounts
collected from
LinkedIn
LinkedIn
Jin et al. [57] Scalable Ac-
tive Learning
Image content
features, such as
colour histogram,
colour correlogram,
CEDD, and Text
features, such as
caption, descrip-
tion, comments,
and Social Network
Features, cluster
size, average time
interval
Popular Facebook
pages with more
than 500,000 fans
Cross-platform
(but demonstrated
only in Facebook)
continued on next page
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Works Algorithm Features Datasets Platform
Chen et al.
[30]
A variant of
maximum
margin clas-
sifier (the
extensions of
LS-SVM)
User based, Book-
mark based, Tag
based, Post based,
and Fan based
A real-world data
set obtained from
delicious.com,
which contains 3
million users
Social Media Web-
sites
Wu et
al. [131]
ADMM [18] User-Message
relation, User-
User relation, and
Message-Message
relation
5090 users together
with 53,484 mes-
sages from Sina
Weibo
Sina Weibo
Costa et al.
[35]
Random
Forest
Content based
features, User
Attributes, Place
Attributes and
Social Attributes
manually labeled
1260 tip spam
from 15th to 22rd,
September 2011 in
Apontador
Apontador, a
Brazilian Loca-
tion Based Social
Network
Table 2.3: Summary of Reviewed Works in Section 2.2.2
2.2.3 Text Based Techniques
Due to the rich linguistic information contained in tweets, researchers [4,33,72] begin
to leverage text information for Twitter spam detection.
Clark et al. proposed a natural language approach to detect automated accounts
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(i.e. spammers). After analysing linguistic characteristics of users’ tweets, they pro-
posed two novel features, average pairwise tweet dissimilarity and word introduction
decay rate. The first one is based on the fact that, legitimate accounts usually have
very dissimilar tweets, while automated ones have very similar contents. The second
feature based on the fact that the two types of accounts have different number of
unique word types introduced over time from a given sample. Experiments show that
these two features can discriminate automated and legitimate accounts effectively.
Based on the finding that spammers use trending topics to disseminate malicious
tweets in [79], Antonakaki [4] study the trending topics from 6.5 million tweets, and
find that the number of trending topics has the highest divergence between spammers
and legitimate users. They then train a decision tree regression classifier, which can
correctly identify 73.5% spammers with 0.25% false positive rate.
In [72], Liu et al. observe that legitimate users focus on limited number topics,
while spammers concentrate on a wide range of topics. In addition, they find that
legitimate users and spammers have different interested topics. Based on these ob-
servation, they use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [13], a topic model to compute
two topic-based features. One is Local Outlier Standard Score (LOSS), which reveals
users’ interest on various topics. Another is Global Outlier Standard Score (GOSS),
which indicates the users interest on certain topics compared with other users. These
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two features can distinguish spammers and legitimate users effectively. When in-
corporating these two features with others in work [65], the classification results are
further improved.
2.3 Discussions
The persistently unsolved challenges in social spam detection field will be outlined in
this section, by using the terminology and context provided above.
2.3.1 Public Data and Ground Truth
The most obvious difficulty in social spam detection is a persistent problem for re-
searchers: the lack of shared datasets to serve as the test data as well as ground truth
(i.e. the flagged message to indicate whether it is spam or not) for validation. How
to balance between individual privacy against other needs, such as security, critical
infrastructure protection, or even science, has long become a challenge or law enforce-
ment, policy makers and scientists. It is good news that laws or legislations prevent
unauthorised parties from examining the normal users’ online social activities. Cur-
rent policy, however, makes it hard or even impossible to provided researchers with
the data they needed to study the OSNs. The current situation is that, laws intended
to protect individual’s privacy leaves the researchers exploring the OSNs’ ecosystem
in the dark. Benevenuto et al. shared their crawled data which contains huge users’
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tweets in 2009. However, the data was unavailable now according to Twitter’s ex-
plicit request. They are only sharing the anonymised topology of the Twitter social
network which makes little sense to detect spammers on OSNs.
To solve the data sharing problem, researchers in other fields have proposed a
untested alternative is to “move code to the data”, where the data providers run the
code and send researchers back the results. There are, however, some difficulties to
do this, since the data providers may not have the resources and incentives to review
the code to ensure it runs correctly.
Researchers has also explored the possibility to share anonymised data with ground
truth [109]. Unfortunately, there are no tools for labelling the data currently. A large
number of works are manually labelling the data before experiments [3,8,121]. While
manual inspection is very expensive for human labour, it is not realistic to label a
large set of spam messages. Some researchers were using honeypots to collect spam-
mers [66,107]. Unfortunately, the amount of collected spammers was relatively small,
even after collecting for a long period [66]. In our work, we apply a commercial
labelling tool provided by our research partner to solve this issue.
2.3.2 Limitations of Current Approaches
Most of the works which use machine learning are focusing on the supervised ap-
proaches. Supervised algorithms, however, have their own inherent limitations. First
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of all, labelled training data is needed for supervised approaches. As pointed out
before, the labelling for spam message is very human labour cost. In addition, the
labelling work must be done repetitively to maintain effectiveness for spam detection
given the volatility of the spam content and some spam posting pattens.
More importantly, we have identified a “Spam Drift” issue, which leads the clas-
sifier become inaccurate gradually as time goes on. Details are cover in Chapter
5.
2.4 Summary
The increasing popularity of Online Social Networks not only attracts research inter-
est, but also malicious activities. Traditional spammers in email have transferred to
OSNs due to its huge user base and easy-suspicious. In order to tackle the spamming
activities, researchers have proposed a number of significant works in a short time
period.
Motivated by the power of machine learning algorithms, a set of works use machine
learning algorithms, such as C4.5, SVM, Naive Bayes, etc to detect Twitter spam.
Works using social relation were also proposed. More recent works are focusing on
the early detection of spam so as to quickly mitigate threats. Text based detection
techniques are very promising as they only extract information from tweets. We
provide a comprehensive review of all these works.
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As a new and promising field, there is still a lot of room for further research.
While most of the techniques build supervised classification frameworks, unsupervised
approaches can be evaluated. Each ML algorithm may perform differently toward
different datasets, and may require different parameter configurations. The use of
a combination of classification models is worth investigating. Parallel processing for
real-time detection may be useful when the classifiers need to cope with millions of
concurrent messages simultaneously. In addition, the early detection of spam is very
important to reduce spam’s harm.
In the next chapter, we will provide an in-depth study from two aspects to better
understand Twitter spam.
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Chapter 3
Analysing and Understanding
Twitter Spam
3.1 Introduction
As Twitter’s user base is growing, it has also become more attractive to spammers.
The study [48] confirmed the existence of large scale spam in Twitter. Spam can
entice victims to malicious sites and pollute Twitter platform. It not only interferes
with real time search and the statistics retrieved by tweet mining tools, but also
wastes human attention [80]. Many spam filtering technologies rely on blacklists to
block spam, but this kind of filtering only suppresses spam links that are blacklisted
at the time of posting. Moreover, most spam was posted on Twitter in the form of
short URLs. This technique generally makes the task of identifying spam on Twitter
more difficult. Therefore, the authors in [48], after examining 400 million public
tweets and 25 million URLs, concluded that blacklists used in Google SafeBrowsing
were ineffective in the detection of spam.
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Figure 3.1: An Example of Twitter Spam
Current security experts suggest the best defence against spam is to educate In-
ternet users to never click suspicious links in tweets. However, spammers leverage
some attractive deceptive topics, such as “gain followers”, “cracked games”, i.e. to
lure users to click their malicious links. We refer this kind of information as deceptive
information. Take Figure 3.1 for example, the claimed “iTunes gift card” attracts a
number of victims fallen into the trap. In this case, “iTunes gift card” is a piece of
deceptive information.
The deceptive information is one of the key factors to the spreading efficiency of
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spam on Twitter. A better understanding of deceptive information is crucial to spam
detection techniques. Therefore, we are motivated to thoroughly study the deceptive
information employed by spammers. We used Trend Micro’s Web Reputation Tech-
nology to conduct the spam labelling on our collection of real data (over 568 million
tweets from two weeks’ capture, including 5.8% spam tweets were identified). We
then used a graphical algorithm to infer more spam. We clustered the spam tweets
into 17 groups according to their content. These 17 groups accounted for 75% of the
spam we identified. We also inspected users’ clicks on the deceptive information. The
results showed there was great variability in the effectiveness of various spam topics.
In addition, We have found that spammers are becoming “smarter” on Twitter.
While researchers are developing methods to detect spam, spammers continuously
invent new spamming strategies to bypass the detection. Thus, we also provide a
detailed study of spammers’ new spamming strategies.
This chapter consists two main sections: one is about investigating deceptive
information, another is about “smarter” spamming strategies.
Our contributions in this chapter are summarised as below:
• We collected a big dataset for the research on Twitter spam, which contains
around 600 million tweets with more than 33 million spam tweets. Based on
the dataset, we present an in-depth analysis of deceptive information contained
in Twitter spam.
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• We used graph clustering techniques to infer more spam with the help of iden-
tified spam.
• We studied the clicks per tweet for four kinds of deceptive topics on our dataset,
and found that the clicks per tweet vary according to different topics.
• We also examined the victims’ country distribution corresponding to different
deceptive information. Interestingly, most victims still clicked the malicious
URLs embedded in tweets, even if they do not speak the language which is used
to write the tweets.
• We have identified “smarter” spammers with new spamming strategies.
3.2 Investigating Deceptive Information on Twit-
ter Spam
3.2.1 Big Dataset and Spam Labelling
We collected a complete Twitter feed with URLs for the two-week period from 24th
September 2013 to the 8th October 2013 (We understand that the study period
overlapped with a significant spam outbreak, which has been confirmed by Twitter).
While it is possible to use Twitter to send spam and other messages without using
URLs, the majority of spam and other malicious messages on the Twitter platform
contain URLs [39]. In the thousands of spam tweets which were inspected by hand
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.com
URL Filter
User
User
URLs clicked by users
  Only non-malicious
can be passed to users
Figure 3.2: Trend Micro WRT System Framework
during the research, we found only a handful of tweets without URLs that could be
considered as spam. In addition, spammers mainly use embedded URLs to make it
more convenient to direct victims to their external sites to achieve their goals, such
as phishing, scams, and malware downloading [143]. Therefore, we restricted this
research to tweets with URLs.
Currently researchers are using two ways to label spam, manual inspection [8,121]
and blacklists filtering, e.g. google safebrowsing, [44, 48, 135, 136]. While manual
inspection can label a small amount of training data, it is very time- and resource-
consuming. A large group of people is needed to help during the process. Although
HIT (human intelligence task) websites can help to label the tweets, it is also costly
and sometimes the results are doubtful [23]. Others apply existing blacklisting service,
such as Google SafeBrowsing to label spam tweets. Nevertheless, these services’ API
limits make it impossible to label a large amount of tweets.
We applied a different way to label spam. There were two steps involved in this
52
Table 3.1: Collected Data
Date Tweets
with URLs
Spam
Tweets
labelled by
WRT
Spam
Tweets
labelled by
Cliques
% Spam Tweets
25 Sept 2013 39,257,353 1,871,502 420,986 5.8%
26 Sept 2013 47,252,411 2,602,228 588,372 6.8%
27 Sept 2013 49,465,975 3,545,467 402,048 8.0%
28 Sept 2013 37,806,326 1,809,205 209,730 5.3%
29 Sept 2013 nil nil nil nil
30 Sept 2013 nil nil nil nil
1 Oct 2013 48,778,630 2,125,149 386,340 5.1%
2 Oct 2013 51,728,355 3,174,904 564,693 7.2%
3 Oct 2013 51,638,205 3,343,961 588,225 7.6%
4 Oct 2013 49,230,861 2,992,197 406,329 6.9%
5 Oct 2013 44,165,664 1,995,249 298,290 5.2%
6 Oct 2013 45,089,730 1,689,424 317,023 4.4%
7 Oct 2013 50,457,403 2,032,507 273,287 4.6%
8 Oct 2013 42,031,232 973,573 178,366 2.7%
9 Oct 2013 16,612,318 448,971 89,162 3.2%
Total 573,514,463 28,604,517 4,722,851 5.8%
process. The first step applied Trend Micro’s Web Reputation Technology [89] (refer
to Figure 5.3) to identify which URLs were deemed malicious. Trend Micro’s WRT
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maintains a large dataset of URL reputation records, which are derived from Trend
Micro’s customer opt-in URL filtering records. WRT is dedicated to collecting the
latest and most popular URLs, analysing them, and then providing its customers with
real-time protection while they are surfing the web. According to the lasted testing
report from AV-Comparatives [34], the block rate of WRT is 99.8%, and false positive
rate is also very low. Hence, we rely on Trend Micro’s WRT to check whether a URL
is malicious. Realising the fact that WRT may miss some malicious URLs, we also
used a clustering algorithm to label more malicious URLs in the second step.
We can see from Table 3.1 that, about 5 million more spam tweets is identified by
our clustering algorithm. The method is well explained in the next section. We define
those tweets which contain malicious URLs as Twitter spam. During this period, we
collected a total of 573.5 million tweets and identified 33.3 million malicious tweets
(28.6 million by WRT and 4.7 million by Cliques), which accounted for approximately
5.8% of all tweets. As can be seen from Table 3.1, the daily spam ratio ranges from
2.7% to 8.0%.
3.2.2 Inferring and Grouping Twitter Spam
As mentioned before, we applied two steps to identify twitter spam. One was using
Trend Micro’s WRT. Although the false positive rate of WRT is very low, it may
also miss some spam tweets. In addition, our research goal is to have high level
54
understanding of the various deceptive topics used in Twitter spam. So, the second
clustering step was involved. The advantages are two fold: 1) by clustering unlabelled
tweets and spam tweets into groups, we can find more spam tweets since only similar
tweets can fall into the spam group; 2) it would be more useful to analyse spam groups,
e.g. studying the behaviour of the spamming group, rather than understanding a huge
mass of spam tweets.
We used a graphical clustering approach which made use of bipartite cliques,
instead of machine learning algorithms to group the spam tweets. In order to identify
bipartite cliques [92, 108], we firstly extracted the domains of URLs embedded in
tweets along with the senders of the tweets. Then, we constructed a graph where the
Twitter users were nodes on one side of the graph while the domains in sent tweets
were nodes on the other side. For each tweet from user U that contains a link with
domain D, we connected this user U to domain D in the graph. Once the graph
was fully connected as in Figure 3.3, a bipartite clique was formed. The rationale for
identifying bipartite cliques is that if we can find groups of accounts that have sent
tweets with spam domains in one clique then it is very likely any account sending all
the domains in this clique is sending spam as well. Figure 3.3 gives an example of
a bipartite clique found in the data consisting of 11 domains and 727 users, that is
each user in the clique has sent tweets which have all the spam domains, and each
spam domain is included in the tweets that all users send.
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11 domains 727 users
novafilxxx.ru
klassxxx.ru
ims-ixxx.ru
3atoxxx.ru
hostelxxx.ru
bummxxx.ru
issechxxx.ru
otdyhxxx.ru
portaxxx.ru
USER 1
USER 2
USER 3
USER 727
kremlinvskexxx.ru
Figure 3.3: An Example of Bipartite Clique
Through this way, we not only found more spam tweets, but also successfully
identified 17 cliques of Twitter spam in our collected data, each of which accounts
for 1% or more of the total spam. Table 3.4 gives a description of each of the clique
generated. Specifically, Clique G is Twitter follower spam which accounts for 2.5%
of the Twitter spam [91]. The first column of Table 3.4 gives a description of the
deceptive information of spam cliques. The second column stands for the percentage
of tweets out of 28 million spam tweets. The “Senders” column represents the number
of confirmed senders in each clique. A confirmed sender has sent tweets to all the
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domains in the corresponding clique. The “Domain” column lists the number of
different domains used by spammers, and the last column indicates the percentage of
accounts within each clique that have been suspended by Twitter after we checked
their status in December 2013 (two months after the collection period).
Table 3.2: Spam Breakdown
Clique Description % Spam
Tweets
Senders Domains % Suspended
A Edu spam, etc 27.28% 797 24 10.3%
B Cracked software,
games spam
8.11% 578 20 31.5%
C Edu spam 6.26% 539 20 19.7%
D Cracked software 6.19% 9509 21 12.0%
E Cracked software
spam
4.39% 727 11 11.6%
F Printer / mobile spam 3.72% 12275 3 89.1%
G Twitter follower spam 2.54% 59205 1 2.1%
H Video / Mobile /
Cracked Software/
games spam
2.23% 8987 50 95.2%
continued on next page
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Clique Description % Spam
Tweets
Senders Domains % Suspended
I Games, computer
spam
2.04% 608 19 97.9%
J Edu spam, etc 1.99% 284 14 47.9%
K Shirt-spam 1.91% 1699 5 74.7%
L Games, mobile printer
spam
1.81% 1197 18 98.8%
M Computer / Printer
spam
1.77% 26603 60 42.3%
N Games / Hardware
spam
1.53% 2514 70 90.0%
O Computer game / mo-
bile device spam
1.41% 1491 73 94.7%
P Credit card spam and
edu spam
1.08% 8541 32 72.5%
Q Cracked software and
games spam
1.02% 9066 4 98.6%
Other spam 24.74% Nil Nil Nil
We have drawn some observations from the results of Table 3.2 as follows:
• The 17 cliques account for 75% of the spam we identified on Twitter.
• Twitter responds relatively effectively to some spam outbreaks. For example
they have identified and suspended over 95% of spam accounts in Clique H, I,
L and Q. However, some spam Clique are not being detected effectively. For
example, Clique A, which accounted for over 27% of the total spam, had only
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approximate 10% of its accounts suspended by Twitter.
• There are a minority of spammers (around 24.74%) who can hardly been grouped
in our study. We categorised them as “Others” in Table 3.2.
3.2.3 Category of Deceptive Topics
Note that some groups in Table 3.2 are sharing the same deceptive information but
they belong to different cliques. In this part, we further characterised them into four
categories:
1. Malware: content in spam which distributes websites containing malware, such
as games, cracked software, and hardware drivers.
2. Phishing: content in spam which distributes phishing sites, purporting to be a
trusted party such as a financial institution.
3. Twitter follower scam: content in spam which entices users to install an app
which is granted authorisation to their Twitter Accounts (Group G in Table
3.4).
4. Advertising: content in spam that distributes sales of education assignments,
shirts, videos, etc.
The four categories are formed according to different deceptive information con-
tained in spam groups. We will later investigate the users’ clicks per tweet for each
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Table 3.3: Spam Categories
Spam Categories Relative Click Through Rate
Malware 0.03065 %
Phishing 0.00959 %
Advertising 0.00239 %
Twitter Follower Scam 0.00112 %
category.
3.2.4 Users’ Clicks on Deceptive Information
Study [58] examined the click through rates of email spam and found click through
rates (the number of people who arrive at the website having clicked the email) vary
from 0.003% to 0.02%. However, [48] estimated the overall click through rate for
Twitter spam as 0.13%, suggesting the click through rate for Twitter spam was two
orders of magnitude higher than for email spam.
Distinguished from the studies [48] and [58], we further inspect users’ clicks on the
deceptive information of each group in order to examine how attractive those topics
are. We make use of Trend Micro’s WRT to calculate the clicks per tweet. A part of
this service is a feedback system for those people who opt in for malicious feedback.
The feedback is anonymous. We examined the feedback data to determine which
spam URLs were being clicked on from tweets. From the feedback, we can see the
60
number of web hits on malicious URLs in one category. Then clicks per tweet equal
to the total number of web hits divided by the number of tweets in this category.
Please note that the clicks/per could be higher as the number of web hits is larger
when considering all the users rather than Trend Micro users only. The clicks per
tweet listed in TABLE 3.3 for “Malware”, “Phishing”, “Advertising” and “Twitter
Follower Spam” are 0.03065, 0.00959, 0.00239, and 0.00112 respectively. This data can
be used to compare the effectiveness of various deceptive spam. However, calculating
the absolute click through rate would require a more global perspective or access to
Twitter’s infrastructure.
From the results listed above, we can see that “malware” has the largest clicks
per tweet among the deceptive information. It is understandable because people are
seeking “cracked software” or “free games” on Twitter. The downloaded software
from those links also contains malware. If they install the so-called “cracked soft-
ware”, malware will also be installed. Once the victim is infected by malware, the
victim’s computer will become one of the “zombies” in a botnet, which will recursively
contribute to the spam campaigns. “Phishing” is also a major topic of deceptive in-
formation which can attract many victims’ interest as spammers are applying more
enticing information to attract victims to click. For instance, the spam tweet may
come with a sentence like “Some one is saying something bad about you” to entice
victims. It seems that users are becoming more wise as the “If you follow me, you
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will get five more followers” spam (“Twitter follower spam”) is much less effective
than others. The “clicks per tweet” data clearly indicates there is great variability in
the effectiveness of various deceptive information.
3.2.5 Who Clicked the Spam
We also investigate the countries of victims who clicked the spam we identified. As
we can access the feedback data of WRT, IP addresses of clickers can be retrieved.
We then use the geolocation database to map IP address with its originating coun-
try. While some IP addresses may be associated with inaccurate locations (wrong
addresses within the same city), the broad geographic area such as cities, is correct.
During the study period, there was an outbreak of Arabic tweets that led to a mal-
ware site. We used this outbreak incident as an example to investigate the click
through rate of malware. The majority of respondents were in Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Sudan followed by the United States. As shown in Figure 3.4a, this malware site
attracted victims from almost all the countries in the Arabic world, wherein Saudi
Arabia contributed the largest portion of the victims with 16%. For the “Phishing”
category, we can see from Figure 3.4b that the majority of victims were from the
U.S., with a percentage of 51%, followed by Japan, Canada, Australia, etc. Victims
from the United States also accounted for the majority of both “Advertising” and
“Twitter Follower” spam. The results are shown in Figure 3.4c and 3.4d. Similar to
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Figure 3.4: Regional Distribution of Victims
email spam targets, the U.S. is also the prime target country of Twitter spam.
We also noticed that landing pages of URLs in many spam tweets were written
in Russian, thus we further investigated the victim who clicked on this kind of spam
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Figure 3.5: Russian Spam
(named “Russia Spam” in Figure 4). As shown in Figure 3.5, the majority of victims
who clicked on “Russia Spam” were in Russia, with a percentage of 50%. However,
victims from many other countries who did not speak Russian also clicked on this
kind of spam. We theorise that the content advertised in this spam was sufficiently
appealing to some users (cracked software and games, free movies, cracks for mobile
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devices, exam answers and homework, etc.), so they used tools such as computer
translation software to access the inappropriate content.
3.2.6 Discussions
In the study conducted by [48], they believe the blacklists, e.g. Google SafeBrowsing,
are no longer suitable for detecting Twitter spam. According to the findings presented
in this work, we have been inspired to think again about whether the blacklists are
indeed useless in the detection of spam on Twitter.
To answer this question, we have examined the response rates of various types of
spam on Twitter in previous sections, and found the response rate could vary widely
depending on the content and the regional factors about the spam. We practically
apply a blacklist technique to Trend Micro’s WRT system with varied priorities and
suspicious rankings to different spam content and regions, and found the detection
performance was reasonably effective to identify around 6% spam (refer to Table 3.1)
in a collection of 573 million tweets. Therefore, we conclude the previous work [48]
which quotes a single response rate for Twitter spam is inadequate. In fact, it is
important to quote response rates for different types of spam involved.
Our findings are also beneficial to the development of spam detection techniques.
There are over 400 million tweets posted by users every day, 25% of which contain
URLs. To monitor such a large volume of tweets and remove those with spam links
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is computationally too expensive to be implemented in the real world. Our findings
reveal that different deceptive information has different click through rates in various
countries. This suggests the spam detection system should pay more attention to
the tweets that contain the deceptive information mentioned before, as detection
efficiency will be greatly improved.
3.3 Spammer Are Becoming “Smarter” on Twit-
ter
As we discussed before, spam is a problem throughout the Internet, and Twitter
is not immune. In addition, Twitter spam is much more successful compared to
email spam [48]. Various methods have been proposed by researchers to deal with
Twitter spam, such as identifying spammers based on the tweeting history [8] or social
attributes [104], abnormal behaviour detection [39], and classifying tweet-embedded
URLs [68]. Although researchers, as well as Twitter itself, have attempted to combat
spam, the percentage of spam in the whole platform is still high. We hypothesise that
this is because spammers are becoming more cunning on Twitter. While researchers
are developing methods to detect spam, spammers continuously invent new spamming
strategies to bypass the detection.
In this section, we will first briefly introduce the well-known ways that spammers
used to avoid or reduce the chance to be caught on Twitter. After that, we will
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show that spammers are now using more advanced spamming strategies, namely
‘Coordinated Posting Behaviour’, ‘Finite-state machine based Spam Template’ and
‘Passive Spam’.
Table 3.4: Spam Breakdown: we name spam type according to the content of it, e.g.
“Cracked Software spam” is about cracked software.
Group Spam Type % Spam Tweets
A Edu spam, etc 27.28%
B Cracked software, games spam 8.11%
C Edu spam 6.26%
D Cracked software 6.19%
E Cracked software spam 4.39%
F Printer / mobile spam 3.72%
G Twitter follower spam 2.54%
H Video / Mobile / Cracked Software/ games spam 2.23%
I Games, computer spam 2.04%
J Edu spam, etc 1.99%
K Shirt-spam 1.91%
L Games, mobile printer spam 1.81%
M Computer / Printer spam 1.77%
N Games / Hardware spam 1.53%
O Computer game / mobile device spam 1.41%
P Credit card spam and edu spam 1.08%
Q Cracked software and games spam 1.02%
Other spam 24.74%
3.3.1 Well-known Spamming Strategy
At the most basic level, spammers make use of various Twitter functions such as @ and
hash (#) tags to engage victims. Spammers can use @ to make spam tweets appear
on the victim’s feed without being a follower of this victim; for example, a spam tweet
will appear on Obama’s timeline, if it is written with @obama. By embedding popular
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hashtag keywords, one spam tweet can become part of a trending topic that can then
be viewed by a victim who is interested in that topic. For example, a spam tweet with
#007 will be disseminated to victims who are browsing the popular book and film
series. Spammers also use other functions of Twitter, such as ‘Reply’, ‘Favourite’,
and ‘Following’ to spread spam [111]. Fortunately, researchers can also make use of
these features (such as the number of followers or the number of hashtags) to detect
Twitter spam [8].
To bypass such detection systems, spammers apply evasion tactics, such as gain-
ing more followers, posting more tweets and so on [135]. They will not be ex-
posed by the simple detection systems described above, because their activity mimics
that of legitimate users. To combat this, researchers propose robust social graph-
based features, such as local clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality [135], dis-
tance/connectivity [104] to detect those fabricated by spammers.
Spammers mainly use embedded URLs to direct victims to external sites. To
evade the domain names, spammers usually use URL shortening service [48]. Even
though, they use a long direction chain to be less traceable. URL based detection
approaches [68] can successfully combat with such spam.
In addition to the aforementioned spamming strategies, our Twitter spam analysis
reveals that spammers are now using more advanced methods (described below).
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Figure 3.6: The number of spam tweets sent by the six groups
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Figure 3.7: FSM based Spam Template
3.3.2 Coordinated Posting Behaviour
We collected a dataset of over 570 million tweets with URLs from 25 Sept 2013 to 09
Oct 2013. Within this dataset, we identified around 33 million spam tweets by using
TrendMicro’s Web Reputation Technology [88], which accounts for 5.8% of the total
tweets. We then clustered the spam tweets using bipartite cliques into 17 groups as
shown in Table 3.4. 17 groups dominate over 75% of the spam, while ‘others’ accounts
for less than 25%, indicating that in general, spam was sent by groups. The details
of data collection and spam labelling is discussed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 3.8: Passive Spam (Please note, these Russian spam tweets are just examples,
it does not mean that this strategy is only applied by Russian spammers.)
We also found that six groups in Table 3.4 (i.e., Groups A, B, C, E, I and J, the
bold and italic letters in the “Group” column) had some common features:
• The URLs embedded in the tweets tend to use a .ru (server of Russian origin)
domain.
• The content of the landing pages are written in Russian.
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• The URLs tend to end with a Unix timestamp, e.g., http://xxxx.ru/xxxx-
1380642617.html.
To study the spamming behaviour of these six groups, we counted the tweets sent
per hour by each group. Group A spread spam actively from 26 September (Fig. 1;
note: data were lost for 29 and 30 September). When Group A stopped sending spam,
Group C started to send spam on 4th of October. Groups C & E, and E & J also
displayed this type of spamming behaviour. We regard this behaviour as ‘coordinated
posting behaviour, a phenomenon in which one group of spam tweets disappears and
another group is being sent at the same time. This kind of posting behaviour is more
difficult to detect, because spammers change the groups of accounts to abuse Twitter.
Although these groups have the “coordinated behaviour”, they were not spreading
the same spam. For example, Group C was spreading spam talking about education
(we named such spam as “edu spam”), while Group E was distributing “Cracked
software spam”. This may indicate that these spamming groups were employed to
perform different spamming tasks.
3.3.3 Finite-state machine based Spam Template
Some have found that most spam is generated using specific templates [45], which
is logical because it is very expensive for spammers to write each tweet manually.
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However, the template is often simple [45], for example: ‘celebrity name’ + ‘an eye-
catching action’ + URL. Therefore, researchers can extract the templates and match
tweets to them to detect spam.
We found that spammers are now using more complex templates to generate
spam. Surprisingly, spammers are using finite-state machines to generate what we
have named ‘finite-state machine-based spam templates’ (Fig. 3.7). One finite-state
machine has a number of states and each edge of it is donated by one word. If we travel
from the beginning to the end, we can have one full sentence, such as “lol, this tweet
by you is funny + SHORT URL” in the finite-state machine. By using one finite-state
machine based spam template, spammers can generate many different tweets. Take
the finite-state machine in Fig. 3.7 for example; it has 8 × 5 × 3 × 2 × 9 = 2160
different routes from start to end. This means that, spammers can use this template
to generate 2160 different spam tweets with little effort. For example, spammers can
write a script which randomly chooses one option from each node to generate one
spam tweet. Relying on simple string signatures to match spam tweets will allow
most of these finite-state machine-based template spam tweets to escape detection.
3.3.4 Passive Spam
As previously described, traditional spam is distributed by using Twitter functions
such @ and #. However, we also found that much spam does not use any tags. As
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a result, such spam cannot be identified by machine learning based spam detection
that makes use of these features. Contrary to traditional spam, which tries to be
involved as much as possible with victims, this spam is only viewed by victims when
they search for specific key words. Consequently, we call this ‘passive spam’. None
of these spam tweets have tags embedded (Fig. 3.8), and they are mostly promoting
cracked games, software or pirate movies.
We found that of the victims who clicked on this kind of spam [88], 50% were
in Russia. However, victims from many other non-Russian-speaking countries also
clicked on this kind of spam. Assuming these users did not speak Russian, we hy-
pothesise that the content advertised in this spam was sufficiently enticing for victims
to use translation software to access the inappropriate content. We also found that
the suspended rate of this type of spam by Twitter is much lower than others, because
they have much lower interaction with users, allowing spammers to make use of this
strategy successfully.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we collect and detect large number of spam tweets (5.8% out of 560
million tweets). After dividing the spam into 17 groups, we further study the deceptive
information in Twitter spam and find that various deceptive content of spam performs
differently in luring victims to malicious sites. We also find the regional response rate
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to varies Twitter spam outbreaks vary greatly. These factors are of great significance
to both academia and industry in the field of Twitter spam detection.
We also note that, while researchers and industry are devoted to developing detec-
tion and mitigation approaches to combat Twitter spam, spammers can thwart their
efforts with ever-evolving spamming techniques. We have identified and described
three complex spamming strategies: ‘coordinated posting’, ‘finite-state machine based
spam template’ and ‘passive spam’. The war with spammers is becoming fiercer and
is far from over; we should therefore continue to analyse spammers behaviour and
propose robust spam detection systems to make a safe Twitter environment for all
users.
In order to stop spammers, researchers have proposed a number of mechanisms.
The focus of recent works is on the application of machine learning techniques into
Twitter spam detection. However, tweets are retrieved in a streaming way, and
Twitter provides the Streaming API for developers and researchers to access public
tweets in real-time. There lacks of a performance evaluation of existing machine
learning based streaming spam detection methods. In next chapter, we bridged the
gap by carrying out a performance evaluation, which was from three different aspects
of data, feature and model. We evaluated the impact of different factors to the spam
detection performance, which included spam to non-spam ratio, feature discretization,
training data size, data sampling, time-related data, and machine learning algorithms.
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The results show the streaming spam tweet detection is still a big challenge and a
robust detection technique should take into account the three aspects of data, feature
and model.
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Chapter 4
A Performance Evaluation of
Machine Learning Based
Streaming Spam Tweets Detection
4.1 Introduction
The research community, as well as Twitter itself, has proposed some spam de-
tection schemes to make Twitter as a spam-free platform. For instance, Twitter
has applied some “Twitter Rules” to suspend accounts if they behave abnormally.
Those accounts, which are frequently requesting to be friends with others, send-
ing duplicate content, mentioning others users or posting URL-only content, will be
suspended by Twitter [114]. Twitter users can also report a spammer to the of-
ficial @spam account. To automatically detect spam, machine learning algorithms
have been applied by researchers to make spam detection as a classification prob-
lem [8, 22, 28, 35, 39, 46, 57, 64, 68, 104, 107, 110, 112, 121, 135, 136, 140, 143]. Most of
these works classify a user is spammer or not by relying on the features which need
76
historical information of the user or the exiting social graph. For example, the feature,
“the fraction of tweets of the user containing URL” used in [8], must be retrieved from
the users’ tweets list; features such as, “average neighbours’ tweets” in [135] and “dis-
tance” in [104] cannot be extracted without the built social graph. However, Twitter
data is in the form of stream, and tweets arrive at very high speed [11]. Despite
that these methods are effective in detecting Twitter spam, they are not applicable
in detecting streaming spam tweets as each streaming tweet does not contain the
historical information or social graph that are needed in detection.
Alternatively, classifying a streaming tweet instead of a Twitter user to spam or
non-spam is more realistic in the real world [8,123]. In this scenario, only information
available in a tweet that is captured by Twitter’s Streaming API can be used for
classification. In order to better understand ML algorithms’ power in classifying
streaming spam tweets, we provided a fundamental evaluation in this work. To achieve
this goal, we have collected a huge amount of tweets. This data contains more than
600 million tweets, in which we further labelled 6.5 million spam tweets by using Trend
Micro’s Web Reputation Service [89]. We also extracted some straightforward features
for each tweet and examined some ML algorithms’ performance on the detection of
spam from various aspects. In summary, our contributions of this chapter are follows:
• We created a big ground-truth for the research on spam tweet detection. We
reported the impact of the data related factors, such as spam to non-spam ratio,
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training data size and data sampling, to the detection performance.
• We extracted 12 lightweight features for streaming tweet spam detection and
found feature discretization is important to spam detection performance. A
new finding is that the features of spam tweets are time varying.
• We investigated six machine learning algorithms to build up the tweet spam
detection model and reported the behaviour of these models under different
experiment settings.
4.2 A Big Dataset of Streaming Spam Tweets
A dataset with ground-truth (annotated instances with class labels for referencing) is
needed to perform a number of challenging machine learning based streaming spam
tweets detection tasks. However, we found no datasets are publicly available specially
for our task. Although there are a few dataset published by some researchers [8,135],
the labelled instances are spammers instead of spam tweets. As a result, we decided
to collect streaming tweets and generate the ground-truth. We will also make this
dataset available for others researchers to use. In this section, we will describe our
large data set with over 600 million tweets, including more than 6.5 million spam
tweets.
78
4.2.1 Collection Procedure
We used Twitter’s Streaming API [65] to collect tweets with URLs. The public
Streaming API provides real-time access to 1% of all the public tweets, but no access
to the tweets sent by protected accounts or direct messages. A tweet is retrieved as
JSON format (See Fig. 4.1 for a incomplete tweet JSON example), which is very
simple and easy to be parsed as each line of this format represents an object [11].
The returned tweet by the Streaming API contains many attributes of the tweets,
such as the text, “the number of retweets”, “contained hastags, URLs”, etc., and
associated Twitter user, such as “the number of tweets”, “account generated time”,
“the number of friends”, etc [116].
While it is possible to use Twitter to send spam and other messages without
using URLs, the majority of spam and other malicious messages on the Twitter
platform contain URLs [39]. In the thousands of spam tweets which were inspected
manually during the research, we found only a few tweets without URLs which could
be considered as spam. In addition, spammers mainly use embedded URLs to make
it more convenient to direct victims to their external sites to achieve their goals, such
as phishing, scams, and malware downloading [143]. Therefore, we restricted this
research to tweets with URLs. During the collection period, we collected a total of
over 600 million tweets with URLs [27].
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Figure 4.1: A Tweet JSON Object
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4.2.2 Ground Truth
Currently researchers are using two ways to generate groundtruth, manual inspection
[8, 121] and blacklists filtering, e.g. google safebrowsing, [44, 48, 135, 136]. While
manual inspection can label a small amount of training data, it is very time- and
resource-consuming. A large group of people is needed to help during the process.
Although HIT (human intelligence task) websites can help to label the tweets, it
is also costly and sometimes the results are doubtful [23]. Others apply existing
blacklisting service, such as Google SafeBrowsing to label spam tweets. Nevertheless,
these services’ API limits make it impossible to label a large amount of tweets.
We used Trend Micro’s Web Reputation Service to identify which URLs were
deemed malicious tweets. Trend Micros WRS maintains a large dataset of URL rep-
utation records, which are derived from Trend Micro customer opt-in URL filtering
records. WRS is dedicated to collecting the latest and the most popular URLs, to
analysing them, and then to providing Trend Micro customers with real-time protec-
tion while they are surfing the web. The maintaining team of WRS is using many
frontier technologies to analysing and labelling URL. They will even manually visit
the URL if necessary. WRS is trusted by Trend Micros large user base. According to
a third party investigation carried out recently, the protection rate of WRT is 99.8%.
Thus, the results is trustworthy, as well as the analysis. Hence, through checking
URLs with the WRS service, we are able to identify whether a URL is malicious and
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the categories a URL belongs to.We define those which contain malicious URLs as
Twitter spam. In our data set of 600 million tweets, we identified 6.5 million malicious
tweets, which accounted for approximately 1% of all tweets.
4.2.3 Features
After labelling the spam tweets, we further extracted features from them. Since Twit-
ter’s Public Streaming API only returned random public tweets and they were not
socially connected, we were not able to build a social graph from the data. As a
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative Distribution Functions of Features
result, it is not possible for us to extract social graph based features such as Local
Clustering Coefficient, Betweenness Centrality [135] and distance [104]. Such expen-
sive features are not suitable to be used in real-time detection, despite that they have
more discriminative power in separating spam and non-spam tweets. Moreover, we
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Table 4.1: 12 Extracted Lightweight Features
Feature Name Description
account age The age (days) of an account since its creation until
the time of sending the most recent tweet
no follower The number of followers of this twitter user
no following The number of followings/friends of this twitter user
no userfavourites The number of favourites this twitter user received
no lists The number of lists this twitter user added
no tweets The number of tweets this twitter user sent
no retweets The number of retweets this tweet
no hashtag The number of hashtags included in this tweet
no usermention The number of user mentions included in this tweet
no urls The number of URLs included in this tweet
no char The number of characters in this tweet
no digits The number of digits in this tweet
are specially focusing on detecting the streaming spam tweets; features which can
be straightforwardly computed from the tweet itself are preferred. We have totally
extracted 12 features from our data set as listed in TABLE 5.1.
According to the object where the features were extracted, the 12 features can be
divided into two categories, user-based features and tweet-based features. User-based
features were extracted from the JSON object “user”, such as account age, which can
be calculated by using the collection date minus the account created data. Other
user-based features, like no of followers, no of followings, no userfavourites, no lists,
and no tweets, can be directly parsed from the JSON structure. Tweet-based features
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includes no retweets, no hashtags, no usermentions, no urls, no chars, and no digits.
While no chars and no digits needs a little computing, i.e. counting them from the
tweet text, others can also be straightforwardly extracted.
4.2.4 Feature Statistics
To look into the characteristics of these features, we plotted the Cumulative Distri-
bution Function (CDF) of them, as shown in Fig. 4.3.
We can see from Fig. 4.3(c) that spammers are involved in more lists than normal
users, so as to be exposed more to the public. Naturally, in order to spread more
spam tweets, spammers send more tweets compared to non-spammers, as shown in
Fig. 4.3(d). In terms of “number of followings”, Fig. 4.3(e) shows that, spammers
do like to follow more users than non-spammers. The aim is also to attract more
attentions from victims to click their spam links.
As Fig. 4.3(h) shows, non-spammers use less hashtags than spammers. There
are about 80% non-spam tweets do not have hashtags embedded in their sent tweets,
while the ratio in spam tweets is only 60%. When it comes to the feature “Number
of Characters Per Tweet”, there is not much difference between spam tweets and
non-spam tweets. The reason could be that spammers begin to imitate the posting
behaviour of normal users. Fig. 4.3(i) shows that spammers tend to use less dig-
its than non-spammers. Due to the limit of pages, we only describe six features’
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Table 4.2: Sampled Datasets
Dataset Sampling Method
NO. of Spam
Tweets
NO. of Non-spam
Tweets
I Continuous 5000 5000
II Continuous 5000 95000
III Non-continuous 5000 5000
IV Non-continuous 5000 95000
characteristics here. In general, the analysis of these features has showed us their
discriminative power to detect Twitter spam.
4.3 Fundamental Evaluation of ML based Stream-
ing Spam Tweets Detection
In this section, we evaluate the spam detection performance on our dataset by using
six machine learning algorithms, Random Forest, C4.5 Decision Tree, Bayes Network,
Naive Bayes, k Nearest Neighbour, and Support Vector Machine. We also sampled
several different data sets to conduct the experiments. The datasets are listed in
TABLE 4.2.
In TABLE 4.2, we can see that the spam to non-spam ratio is 1:1 in Dataset I and
III while the ratio is 1:19 in Dataset II and IV. In previous works, most of the datasets
are nearly evenly distributed; the spam to non-spam ration is nearly 1:1. However,
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Twitter has around 5% spam tweets of all existing tweets in the real world [48]. The
evenly distributed dataset cannot represent the Twitter sphere. Consequently, we
sampled Dataset II and IV which has a spam ration of 1:19 to simulate the real world
scenario.
All of the four datasets are randomly selected from the whole 600 million tweets.
However, the datasets can be divided into two groups based on the sampling method:
Dataset I and II are both randomly selected from the whole dataset, but the tweets
were sent in a certain continuous time frame. On the other hand, the tweets in
Dataset III and IV were not sent continuously. Instead, those tweets were totally
independent from each other.
4.3.1 The Process of ML based Twitter spam detection
This subsection describes the process of Twitter spam detection by using machine
learning algorithms. Fig. 5.3 illustrates the steps involved in building a supervised
classifier and detecting Twitter spam. Before classification, a classifier which contains
the knowledge structure should be trained with the pre-labelled tweets. After the
Classification Model gains the knowledge structure of the training data, it can be used
to predict a new incoming tweet. The whole process consists of two steps: learning
and classifying. Firstly, features of tweets will be extracted and formatted as a vector
~F = {f1, f2, . . . , fn}. The class labels (spam or non-spam) could be get via some other
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approaches (like manual inspection). Features and class label will be combined as one
instance for training. One training tweet can then be represented by a pair contain-
ing one feature vector which represents a tweet, and the expected result (~F , label),
and the training set is the vector ~TS = {( ~F1, label1), ( ~F2, label2), ( ~Fn, labeln)}. The
training set is the input of machine learning algorithm, the classification model will
be built after training process. In the classifying process, timely captured tweets
T = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn} will be labelled by the trained classification model.
4.3.2 Performance Metrics
In order to evaluate the performance of spam detection approaches, some metrics are
imported from Information Retrieval are widely used by the researchers.
4.3.2.1 Positives and Negatives
Suppose there is a tweet t and the spam class S. The output of the classifier is whether
t belongs to S or not. A common way to evaluate the classifier’s performance is to
use True Positives, False Positives, False Positives, False Negatives. These
metrics are defined as following:
• True Positives (TP), tweets of class S correctly classified as belonging to class
S.
• False Positives (FP), tweets not belonging to class S incorrectly classified as
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Table 4.3: Evaluation Metrics
Predicted
Sapm Non-sapm
True Spam TP FN
Non-spam FP TN
belonging to class S.
• True Negatives (TN), tweets not belonging to class S correctly classified as not
belonging to class S.
• False Negatives (FN), tweets of class S incorrectly classified as not belonging
to class S.
The relations of TP, FP, TN and FN in social spam detection are shown in Table 4.3
In order to measure the ability to detect spam, we also import True Positive Rate
(TPR), and False Positive Rate (FPR).
• TPR is defined as the ratio of those spam tweets correctly classified as belonging
to class spam to the total number of tweets in class spam, it can be calculated
by
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(4.3.1)
• FPR is defined as the ratio of those non-spam tweets incorrectly classified as
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belonging to spam class S to the total number of non-spam tweets
FPR =
FP
FP + FN
(4.3.2)
4.3.2.2 Precision, Recall and F-measure
Literature also uses Precision, Recall, and F-measure to evaluate per-class perfor-
mance.
• Precision is defined as the ratio of those tweets that truly belong class S to
those identified as class S, it can be calculated by
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(4.3.3)
• Recall (which is also known as Detection Rate in the detection scenario) is
defined as the ratio of those tweets correctly classified as belonging to class S
to the total number of users in class S, it can be calculated by
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(4.3.4)
• F-measure is a combination of precision and recall, it is a widely adopt metric
to evaluate per-class performance, it can be calculated by
F −measure = 2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
(4.3.5)
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Table 4.4: Performance Evaluation on Dataset I and II
Unit: % Dataset I Dataset II
Classifier TPR FPR F-measure TPR FPR F-measure
RandomForest 92.9 5.6 93.6 92.9 7.1 56.6
C4.5 92.4 8.4 92 92.4 10.9 46.2
BayesNetwork 75.3 8.7 81.9 75.3 9.8 41.6
Naive Bayes 97.3 77.1 70.9 97.3 78.8 11.5
Knn 91.9 11.1 90.5 91.9 15.9 37.3
SVM 79.1 18.9 79.9 79.1 19.5 28.8
4.3.3 The Impact of Spam to Non-spam Ratio
In this section, We evaluate the impact of spam to non-spam ratio of the above-
mentioned machine learning algorithms on Dataset I and II. Each classifier in this set
of experiments was trained with a dataset of 1000 spam tweets and 1000 non-spam
tweets. Then these trained classifiers were used to detect spam in the four sampled
datasets. As in [135], we also used True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate
(FPR) and F-measure to evaluate the performance of these classifiers.
As seen in TABLE 4.4, most of the classifiers can achieve more than 90% TPR,
expect Bayes Network and SVM, on both datasets. These classifiers can also reach
satisfactory F-measure on Dataset I. However, the F-measures decrease dramatically
when evaluating on Dataset II, i.e. when the spam to non-spam ration is 1:19.
To figure out why F-measure drops on Dataset II, TABLE 4.5 outputs the confu-
sion matrix of Random Forest when evaluated on both datasets. Since the classifiers
were trained by the same dataset, we can see that, there was no impact on the True
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Table 4.5: Confusion Matrix of Random Forest on Both Datasets
classified as –> spam non-spam spam non-spam
spam 4645 355 4645 355
non-spam 282 4718 6766 88234
Dataset I Dataset II
Positives and False Negatives of spam class when the spam to non-spam ratio was
changed, so Recall, which is define as the ratio of the number of tweets classified
correctly as spam to the total number of real spam tweets, stayed the same. How-
ever, when more non-spam tweets were involved in the test, the number of False
Positives increased exponentially. Thus, the precision, which is define as the ratio of
the number of tweets classified correctly as spam to the total number of predicted
spam tweets, decreased. As a result, F-measure, which is combination of precision
and recall, decreased dramatically due the decrease of precision. Generally, we find
that the F-measure of machine learning based classifiers is quite low as there are much
more non-spam tweets than spam tweets.
4.3.4 The Impact of Feature Discretisation
In this subsection, the impact of feature discretisation of selected classifiers, such as
Naive Bayes, kNN, and SVM when on discretised and non-discretised Dataset I and
II, is evaluated.
Fig. 4.4 - 4.6 shows the True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, F-measure and
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classification speed of spam detection on Dataset I and II. We can see that, the
False Positive Rate of Naive Bayes decreases dramatically after discretisation, from
80% to 20% on Dataset I. Similar on Dataset II, the FPR declined from 45% to less
than 5%. However, the performance of Naive Bayes also decreases in terms of True
Positive Rate. The TPR of Naive Bayes drops from 94.5% to 88% and 74.5% to 58%,
respectively on Dataset I and II. When it comes to F-measure, the performance of
Naive Bayes increases around 3% and over 20% on Dataset I and II. Overall, feature
discretisation has positive impact for Naive Bayes, especially when on Dataset II.
Similarly, feature discretisation can help to improve performance for kNN and SVM
on both datasets. For example, the F-measure has been improved 5% for kNN and
10% for SVM on Dataset I. We also notice that, although SVM can achieve 75% F-
measure on Dataset I, it becomes useless on Dataset II with less than 5% F-measure
without feature discretisation. However, SVM can achieve over 80% F-measure after
discretising features. In general, feature discretisation can improve performance of
classifiers for Twitter spam detection.
4.3.5 The Impact of Increasing Training Data
We evaluate the performance of all six classifiers with training data varying from 100
samples to 1000 samples in this subsection.
Fig. 4.7 shows the spam detection performance with increasing training samples
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Figure 4.5: False Negative Rate on Spam
on Dataset I. In Fig. 4.7a, one can find that Random Forest outperforms all the other
classifiers with TP rate ranging from 78% to 85%, followed by kNN. However, Navie
Bayes with discretisation has the lowest FP rate, while SVM has the highest FP rate.
When it comes to F-measure, Random Forest still ranks as number one among all
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Figure 4.6: F-measure on Spam
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Figure 4.7: Spam detection with increasing training size on Dataset I
classifiers, with a range from 70% to 75%.
Fig. 4.8 reports the spam detection performance with increasing training samples
on Dataset II. Unsurprisingly, Random Forest also performs the best in terms of all
three metrics with more than 40% TP rate and less then 1% FP rate. In addition, the
increment of F-measure from 100 training samples to 1000 training samples is more
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Figure 4.8: Spam detection with increasing training size on Dataset II
than 10% for all classifiers except for Naive Bayes. Especially for Random Forest, the
F-measure increases from 36% to 65%, with an increment of over 30%.
One would expect that the performance of the classifiers will increase with addi-
tional training data [50]. However, we find that the performance is relatively stable
even with more training data. In Fig. 4.7c, we can find that F-measure of these clas-
sifiers can reach as high as 80%. However, it cannot be improved further by simply
increasing the training data. Specifically, the F-measure rises slightly (less than 3%)
for Random Forest, C4.5 Decision Tree, and kNN, after the training samples num-
ber of 500. There is no growth for Bayes Network and SVM in terms of F-measure.
Particularly, F-measure of Navie Bayes even drops with more training samples. This
phenomenon also happens with Dataset II. For instance, the F-measure of Naive
Bayes stays around 30% despite the growth of training samples. We conclude that
there is little benefit by simply increasing the training data when the training size
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Figure 4.9: Spam detection on Dataset I VS Dataset III
has reached a certain size. More pre-processes, such as developing more discrimi-
nant features or cleaning training data [144], should be done to further improve the
performance.
4.3.6 The Impact of Different Sampling Method
During our study, we also notice that classifiers’ performance is better on the dataset
where the tweets are sampled from a continuous period of time than that where the
tweets are randomly selected. To further study this, Dataset III and IV are sampled.
The samples in Dataset I and II are randomly selected, while those in Dataset III and
IV are continuous. We also perform 10-fold cross-validation on both datasets. The
results are shown in Fig. 4.9 and 4.10.
The results in Fig. 4.9a indicate that the TP rates of all classifiers on Dataset III
arise around 10% compared to the performance on Dataset I, expect Naive Bayes.
For example, the TP rates of C4.5 Decision Tree and kNN are 12% higher on Dataset
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Figure 4.10: Spam detection on Dataset II VS Dataset IV
III than those on Dataset I. In addition, most of these classifiers can reach 80% TP
rate; some of them, such as C4.5 Decision Tree, kNN and Random Forest can even
have over 90% TP rates when evaluated on Dataset III. Similarly, the FP rates on
Dataset III drops significantly, especially for SVM, it drops from nearly 40% to less
than 20%, with an decrease of 20%. Most of the classifiers have a FP rate of less
than 10%. In terms of F-measure, all classifiers evaluated on Dataset III except Navie
Bayes outperform those on Dataset I. Furthermore, several classifiers can have more
than 90% F-measure, which is very effective in detection Twitter spam.
Fig. 4.10 shows the TP rates, FP rates and F-measures of all the classifiers
evaluated on Dataset II and IV. The difference of TP rates on Dataset II and 4 is
significantly huge, which is around 30% to 40%. When it comes to the metric of
F-measure, the same difference exists. For instance, the F-measure of Random Forest
evaluated on Dataset IV can reach as high as 95%, which is 30% higher than it on
Dataset II. In this set of experiments, we find that Naive Bayes and SVM work badly
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(b) C4.5 Decision Tree
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Figure 4.11: Trend of Detection Rate
when on the datasets with 1:19 spam to non-spam ratio. Naive Bayes can only detect
less than 10% spam tweets, while SVM miss all the spam tweets. We will put the
problem why Naive Bayes and SVM cannot work well on imbalanced datasets as a
future work.
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of different classifiers on two kinds
of datasets (randomly sampled and continuously sampled), and find that classifiers
have much better performance in detection spam tweets on the continuous datasets.
We will further investigate this in Section 4.3.7.
4.3.7 The Investigation of Time-Related Data
As discussed in the above section, the performance varies when in differently sampled
datasets. We believe that “time” plays an important role in this difference. In
this section, a serious of experiments are conducted from various kinds of views to
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Figure 4.12: Changes of Average Values of Features
Table 4.6: KL Divergence of Spam and Nonspam Tweets of two Consecutive Days
D1 VS D2 D2 VS D3 D3 VS D4 D4 VS D5 D5 VS D6 D6 VS D7 D7 VS D8 D8 VS D9 D9 VS D10
f1 0.36 0.04 0.34 0.03 0.44 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.29 0.05 0.26 0.03 0.34 0.04
f2 0.24 0.1 0.22 0.1 .26 0.1 0.19 0.1 0.21 0.1 0.21 0.1 0.17 0.1 0.38 0.1 0.35 0.1
f3 0.28 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.32 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.08 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.08
f4 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.19 0.08
f5 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01
f6 0.98 0.35 0.52 0.35 0.63 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.45 0.34 0.4 0.34 0.45 0.35 0.5 0.35 0.52 0.36
f7 0.1 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.08 0.04
f8 0.19 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.03 0 0.02 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.04 0 0.02 0
f9 0.09 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.01 0
f10 0 0 0.03 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.32 0 0.27 0
f11 0.26 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.1 0 0.09 0 0.26 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.2 0.02
f12 0.04 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.03 0.01 0.03 0 0.04 0 0.04 0 0.46 0 0.46 0
investigate the “time-related” issue in detecting streaming spam. In order to perform
such evaluation, we sampled a new dataset which is constituted by 10 consecutive
days’ tweets, while each day contains 100k spam tweets and 100k non-spam tweets.
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4.3.7.1 From the view of Detection Rate
We perform a serious of experiments in this section to show how Detection Rates
of spam and non-spam changes while testing on different days. As in [135], we use
Detection Rate to show the classifier’s performance.
During our experiments, Day 1 data is divided into two parts, half for training
pool where training data can be extracted from, and another half for testing purpose.
We create a classifier by using a supervised classification algorithm, and train it with
10k spam and 10k non-spam tweets which are randomly sampled from the training
pool of Day 1. Then the classifier is used to classify the testing data in Day1, as well
as the testing samples in Day 2 to Day 10. In order to make the results more fair, we
only use half of the samples for testing in Day 2 to Day 10.
Fig. 5.5 shows the Detection Rate of both spam and non-spam tweets on three
classifiers, Random Forest, C4.5 Decision Tree and Bayes Network. We can see that,
the DR of non-spam is very stable, it keeps above 90% for Random Forest and C4.5
Decision Tree, and near 90% for Bayes Network, despite the change of testing data.
However, when it comes to spam tweets, the DR fluctuates dramatically, and the
overall trend is decreasing. The DRs for Random Forest and C4.5 Decision Tree are
90% in the first day, but they could decrease to less then 40% in the 9th day. This
phenomenon also applies with Bayes Network, the DR decreases from 70% on 1st day
to less than 50% for most of the other testing days. From this, we can see that the
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Detection Rate is decreasing when training data and testing data are from different
period of time.
4.3.7.2 From the view of average values of features
To further investigate the reason why performance decreases when training and testing
data are from different days, we calculate the average value of each feature in all tweets
of each day, and find that the average value of features from spam tweets varies while
that is more stable in terms of non-spam tweets.
Fig. 5.1 shows the changing trend of average value of three features for two classes
in 10 days. In general, the vary of average value of feature from spam tweets is greater
than that of non-spam tweets. Fig. 5.1a shows that, the average value of Account Age
for spam tweets ranges from 530 to 730, and the variation is dramatic. However, it
deviates from 710 to 740 for non-spam tweets. We infer that spammers are creating a
large number of new accounts to send spam once their old account are blocked, which
leads the decrease of average age for spammers. Naturally, spammers tend to keep
following new friends as they want to be exposed to public more frequently, whereas
for non-spammers, their number of followings are not changing too much once they
have built their friend circle, as we can see from Fig. 5.1b. Due to the page limit,
we excluded the figures of other features. However, most of the other features have
the same trend as expected: the average value of one feature varies for spam tweets,
while it is stable for non-spam tweets. Consequently, the detection of one classifier
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become inaccurate, as the statistical features of the testing data varies.
4.3.7.3 From the view of KL Divergence of two days’ feature distribution
Previously, we simply compared the some representative statistics, such as the mean
values of features to show the reason why classifiers’ performance decreases while
training and testing are done in different days. To further illustrate the changing of
the statistical features in a dataset, a natural approach is to model the distribution
of the data [37]. One of the most common measure to compute the distance of
distributions is Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence [37, 102]. The suitability of KL
Divergence to be used in measuring distributions can be found in [37].
We compute the KL Divergence of each feature of spam and nonspam tweets in
consecutive two days, which is listed in TABLE 5.2. The shadowed ones are the KL
Divergence of features of nonspam tweets, while the other are the KL Divergence
of features of spam tweets. KL Divergence indicates the dissimilarity of two distri-
butions. The larger the value is, the more dissimilar the two distributions are. As
shown in Table 5.2, the KL Divergence of spam tweets in two consecutive days are
much larger than that of the nonspam tweets for more than half the features. Taking
f1 for example, the KL Divergence of spam between Day 1 and Day 2 is 0.36, while
it is only 0.04 for non-spam, which indicates that the distribution of f1 of spam in
Day 1 is much different to it in D2, compared with nonspam tweets’ distribution.
From these KL Divergence values, we can see that the distribution of spam tweets’
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features is changing unpredictably from day to day. Nevertheless, the distribution
of training data is unchanged. So, the knowledge structure which learns from the
unchanged training data is not updated while being used to classify new incoming
tweets. That’s why the performance of classifiers becomes inaccurate.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we provide a fundamental evaluation of ML algorithms on the detec-
tion of streaming spam tweets. In order to perform this evaluation, we firstly collected
a large number of 600 million public tweets. Then we applied Trend Micro’s Web Rep-
utation System to label as many as 6.5 million spam tweets. We also extracted 12
light-weight features which are able to differentiate spam tweets and non-spam tweets
from this labelled dataset. Furthermore, we used CDF figures to illustrate the char-
acteristics of extracted features. We leveraged these features to machine learning
based spam classification later in our experiments. To investigate the ability of spam
detection of different classifiers, we sampled four different datasets to simulate various
scenarios. In our evaluation, we found that classifiers’ ability to detect Twitter spam
reduced when in a near real-world scenario since the imbalanced data brings bias. We
also identified that Feature discretisation was an important pre-process to ML based
spam detection. Secondly, increasing training data only cannot bring more benefits
to detect Twitter spam after a certain number of training samples. We should try to
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bring more discriminative features or better model to further improve spam detection
rate. Thirdly, classifiers can detect more spam tweets when the tweets were sampled
continuously rather than randomly selected tweets.
From the third point, we thoroughly analysed the reason why classifiers’ perfor-
mances reduced when training and testing data were in different days from three
point of views. We conclude that the performance decreases due to the fact that
the distribution of features changes of later days’ dataset, while the distribution of
training dataset stays the same. This problem will exist in streaming spam tweets
detection, as the new tweets are coming in the forms of streams, but the training data
set is not updated. We will work on this issue in the future. This problem is referred
as “Spam Drift”, which will be further studied and addressed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 5
Addressing “Spam Drift”: Lfun
approach
5.1 Introduction
Research shows that blacklist fails to protect victims from new spam due to its time
lag [48]; more than 90% victims may visit a new spam link before it is blocked by
blacklists [114]. In order to address the limitation of blacklists, researchers have
proposed some machine learning based schemes which can make use of spammers’ or
spam tweets’ statistical features to detect spam without checking the URLs [43,136].
Machine Learning (ML) based detection schemes involve several steps. First,
statistical features, which can differentiate spam from non-spam, are extracted from
tweets or Twitter users (such as account age, number of followers or friends and
number of characters in a tweet). Then a small set of samples are labelled with
class, i.e. spam or non-spam, as training data. After that, machine learning based
classifiers are trained by the labelled samples, and finally the trained classifiers can be
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used to detect spam. A number of ML based detection schemes have been proposed
by researchers [8, 107,135,143].
However, the observation in our collected data set shows that the characteristics
of spam tweets are varying over time. We refer to this issue as “Twitter Spam
Drift”. As previous ML based classifiers are not updated with the “changed” spam
tweets, the performance of such classifiers are dramatically influenced by “Spam Drift”
when detecting new coming spam tweets. Why do spam tweets drift over time? It
is because that spammers are struggling with security companies and researchers.
While researchers are working to detect spam, spammers are also trying to avoid
being detected. This leads spammers to evade current detection features through
posting more tweets or creating spam with the similar semantic meaning but using
different text [104,135].
In this chapter, we firstly illustrate the “Twitter spam drift” problem through
analysing the statistical properties of Twitter spam in our collected dataset and then
its impact on detection performance of several classifiers. By observing that there are
“changed” spam samples in the coming tweets, we propose a novel Lfun (Learning
from unlabelled tweets) approach, which updates classifiers with the spam samples
from the unlabelled incoming tweets. In summary, our contributions are listed below:
• We collect and label a real-world dataset, which contains 10 consecutive days’
tweets with 100k spam tweets and 100k non-spam tweets in each day (2 million
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tweets in total). This dataset is available for researchers to study Twitter spam
1.
• We investigate the “Twitter Spam Drift” problem from both data analysis and
experimental evaluation aspects. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to study this problem in Twitter spam detection.
• We propose a novel Lfun approach which learns from unlabelled tweets to deal
with “Twitter Spam Drift”. Through our evaluations, we show that our pro-
posed Lfun can effectively detect Twitter spam by reducing the impact of “Spam
Drift” issue.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the collection and
labelling of the data used in our work is introduced. Meanwhile, the “Spam Drift”
problem is illustrated and justified. Then we introduce our Lfun approach in Section
5.3, and analyse the performance benefit of our approach. Section 5.4 evaluates our
Lfun approach and compares it with four traditional machine learning algorithms.
Finally, Section 5.6 concludes this work and introduces our future work.
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Table 5.1: Extracted Features
Feature Name Description
account age The age (days) of an account since its creation until
the time of sending the most recent tweet
no follower The number of followers of this twitter user
no following The number of followings/friends of this twitter user
no userfavourites The number of favourites this twitter user received
no lists The number of lists this twitter user added
no tweets The number of tweets this twitter user sent
no retweets The number of retweets this tweet
no hashtag The number of hashtags included in this tweet
no usermention The number of user mentions included in this tweet
no urls The number of URLs included in this tweet
no char The number of characters in this tweet
no digits The number of digits in this tweet
5.2 Problem of Twitter Spam Drift
5.2.1 10-day groundtruth
A labelled dataset is important for classification tasks, such as Twitter spam detec-
tion. In this work, we used Twitter’s Streaming API to collect tweets with URLs in a
period of 10 consecutive days. While it is possible to send spam without embedding
URLs on Twitter, the majority of spam contains URLs [33,39,45]. We have inspected
hundreds of spam tweets by hand and only find a few tweets without URLs which
1You can download our dataset from http://nsclab.org/nsclab/resources/
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could be considered as spam. In addition, spammers mainly use embedded URLs
to make it more convenient to direct victims to external sites to achieve their goals,
such as phishing, scams, and malware downloading [143]. Therefore, we only focus
on spam tweets with URLs.
Currently, researchers use two ways to build ground-truth, manual inspection and
blacklists filtering. While manual inspection can label a small number of training
data, it is very time- and resource-consuming. A large group of people are needed to
check tens of thousands of tweets. Although HIT (human intelligence task) websites
can help label the tweets, it is also costly and sometimes the results are doubtful [23].
Others apply existing blacklisting services, such as Google SafeBrowsing and URIBL
[44] to label spam tweets. Nevertheless, these services’ API limits make it impossible
to label a large amount of tweets.
We apply Trend Micro’s Web Reputation Technology to identify which tweets
are deemed spam [27]. Trend Micro’s WRT system maintains a large dataset of
URL reputation records, which are derived from their customers’ opt-in URL filtering
records. WRT system is dedicated to collecting the latest and the most popular
URLs, to analysing them, and then to providing Trend Micro customers with real-
time protection while they are surfing the web. Hence, through checking URLs with
the WRT system, we are able to identify whether a URL is malicious or not. We
define those which contain malicious URLs as Twitter spam. WRT system is reliable
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as the protection rate of it is 100%, as stated in AV Comparatives’ testing report.
In addition, we have done a manual inspection of hundreds of tweets to confirm the
reliability of WRT. In our collected data, we labelled one million spam tweets and
one million non-spam tweets for 10 days, with 100k spam tweets and 100k non-spam
tweets for each day.
Feature extraction is a key component in machine learning based classification
tasks [141]. Some studies [8, 107, 121] have applied a few features which make use
of historical information of a user, such as tweets that the user sent in a period of
time. While these features may be more discriminative, it is not possible to collect
them due to the restrictions of Twitter’s API. Other researchers [104, 135] applied
some social graph based features, which are hard to be evaded. Nevertheless, It is
significantly expensive to collect those features, as they cannot be calculated until the
social graph is formed. Thus, those expensive features are not suitable for real-time
detection, despite that they have more discriminative power in separating spammers
and legitimate users. The longer time a spam tweet exists, the more chance it can
be exposure to victims. Thus, it is very important to detect spam tweets as early
as possible. To reduce the loss caused by spam, real-time detection is in demand.
Consequently, we only focus on extracting light-weight features which can be used
for timely detection as in [49]. These features can be straightforwardly extracted
from the collected tweets’ JSON data structure [90] with little computation. We have
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Figure 5.1: Changes of Average Values of Features
totally extracted 12 features from our dataset as listed in TABLE 5.1.
5.2.2 Problem Statement
In the real world, the statistical features of spam tweets are changing in unpredicted
ways over time. As a result, machine learning based detection system becomes inac-
curate. The issue is referred to as “Spam Drift” problem in our previous paper [28].
Here, we present an investigation of “Spam Drift” problem from the aspect of the
change of mean value of each feature from day to day.
Fig. 5.1 shows the changing trend of average value of each feature for two classes
in 10 days. In general, the variation of average value of feature from spam tweets
is greater than that of non-spam tweets. Fig. 5.1a shows that, the average value of
Account Age for spam tweets ranges from 530 to 730, and the variation is dramatic.
However, it deviates from 710 to 740 for non-spam tweets, which is relatively stable.
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It is due to the fact that spammers are creating a large number of new accounts to
send spam once their old account are blocked. For instance, we have 3 spammers
with account age of 2 days, 6 days, 10 days in the first day, the average value of
Account Age is (2 +6 +10) / 3 = 6 days. In the second day, if the spammer whose
account age is 2 days is detected and removed, the average value of Account Age is
(6+10) / 2 = 8 days, which increases. In addition, spammers may also generate new
accounts with 0 day Account Age to spread spam after some of their accounts are
block, which can lead the decrease of average value of Account Age. That is why
the average value of Account Age is fluctuating. Naturally, spammers tend to keep
following new friends as they want to be exposed to public more frequently, whereas
for non-spammers, their number of followings are not changing too much once they
have built their friend circle, as we can see from Fig. 5.1c. As expected, most of the
other features have the same trend: the average value of one feature varies for spam
tweets, while it is stable for non-spam tweets.
To sum up, the characteristics of spam tweets is varying from day to day, while
that of non-spam tweets is not changing much, as we see from Fig. 5.1. “Spam Drift”
is a crucial issue in Twitter spam detection, which is in great need to be solved.
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Table 5.2: KL Divergence of Spam and Nonspam Tweets of two Consecutive Days
D1 VS D2 D2 VS D3 D3 VS D4 D4 VS D5 D5 VS D6 D6 VS D7 D7 VS D8 D8 VS D9 D9 VS D10
f1 0.36 0.04 0.34 0.03 0.44 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.29 0.05 0.26 0.03 0.34 0.04
f2 0.24 0.1 0.22 0.1 .26 0.1 0.19 0.1 0.21 0.1 0.21 0.1 0.17 0.1 0.38 0.1 0.35 0.1
f3 0.28 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.32 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.08 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.08
f4 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.19 0.08
f5 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01
f6 0.98 0.35 0.52 0.35 0.63 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.45 0.34 0.4 0.34 0.45 0.35 0.5 0.35 0.52 0.36
f7 0.1 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.08 0.04
f8 0.19 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.03 0 0.02 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.04 0 0.02 0
f9 0.09 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.01 0
f10 0 0 0.03 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.32 0 0.27 0
f11 0.26 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.1 0 0.09 0 0.26 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.2 0.02
f12 0.04 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.03 0.01 0.03 0 0.04 0 0.04 0 0.46 0 0.46 0
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5.2.3 Problem Justification
In previous section, we simply compare some representative statistics, such as the
mean values of features to show the “Spam Drift” problem. To further illustrate the
changing of the statistical features in a dataset, a natural approach is to model the
distribution of the data [37]. There are two kinds of approaches: parametric and non-
parametric. Parametric approaches are very powerful when the specific distribution
of the dataset, like Normal Distribution, is already known. However, the distribution
of the Twitter spam data is unknown, thus it is not possible to apply parametric
approaches. Consequently, non-parametric methods, such as statistical tests, which
make no assumptions of the dataset distributions are used by researchers [42].
The statistical tests are to compute the distance of two distributions to determine
the change. One of the most common measures to compute the distance of distribu-
tions is Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence [37,102]. The suitability of KL Divergence
to be used in measuring distributions can be found in [37]. In [79], Juan et al. also
use KL Divergence to model language models of tweets. KL Divergence, which is also
known as relative entropy is defined as
Dkl(P‖Q) =
∑
i
P (i)log
P (i)
Q(i)
.
It is used to compare two probability distributions. We need to map data points into
distributions to apply the formula. According to [36], let s = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a
multi-set from a finite set F containing numerical feature values, and denote N(x|s)
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the number of appearances of x ∈ s, thus the relative proportion of each x is donated
by
Ps(x) =
N(x|s)
n
.
However, the ratio of p/q is undefined if Q(i) = 0. As suggested by [62], the estimate
Ps is replaced as,
Ps(x) =
N(x|s) + 0.5
n+ |F |/2 .
when |F | is number of elements in the finite set F. The distance between two day’s
tweets, D1 and D2 is,
D(D1‖D2) =
∑
x∈F
PD1(x)log
PD1(x)
PD2(x)
.
We compute the KL Divergence of each feature of spam and non-spam tweets in
two adjacent days, which is listed in TABLE 5.2. The shadowed ones are the KL
Divergence of features of non-spam tweets, while the others are the KL Divergence
of features of spam tweets. KL Divergence indicates the dissimilarity of two distri-
butions. The larger the value is, the more different the two distributions are. As
shown in Table 5.2, the KL Divergence of spam tweets in two adjacent days are much
larger than that of the non-spam tweets for more than half the features. Taking f1
(”account age”) for example, the KL Divergence of spam between Day 1 and Day 2
is 0.36, while it is only 0.04 for non-spam, which indicates that the distribution of
f1 of spam in Day 1 is much different to it in D2, compared with non-spam tweets’
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distribution. From these KL Divergence values, we can see that the distribution of
spam tweets’ features is changing unpredictably from day to day. Nevertheless, the
distribution of training data is unchanged. As the knowledge structure which learns
from the unchanged training data is not updated while being used to classify new
incoming tweets, the performance of classifiers becomes inaccurate. As it is illus-
trated in Fig. 5.2, while the spam changes, the decision boundary is not updated.
Consequently, more spam tweets are misclassified as non-spam.
5.3 Proposed Scheme: Lfun
Existing machine learning based spam detection methods suffer from the problem of
“Spam Drift” due to the change of statistical features of spam tweets as time goes
on. When “spam drifts”, the old classification model is not updated with “changed”
spam samples, as a result, the classification results will gradually become inaccurate.
To solve this problem, obtaining the “changed” samples to update the classification
model is very important. By observing that there are such samples in the unlabelled
incoming tweets which are very easy to collect, we propose a scheme called “Lfun” to
address “Spam Drift” problem.
This section presents our Lfun scheme to deal with the drift problem in Twitter
spam detection. Fig. 5.3 illustrates the framework of our proposed scheme. There are
two main components in this framework: LDT is to learn from detected spam tweets
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Figure 5.3: Lfun Framework
and LHL is to learn from human labelling. In “Drifted Spam Detection” scenario, we
have already got a small amount of labelled spam and non-spam tweets. However,
there are not enough samples of “changed” spam. It is extraordinary expensive to
have human label a large amount of “changed” tweets. Consequently, we make use
of the above mentioned two components to automatically extract “changed” spam
tweets from a set of unlabelled tweets, which are very easy to collected from Twitter.
Once getting enough labelled “changed” spam tweets, we implement the scheme which
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employs a sufficiently powerful algorithm, Random Forest, to perform classification.
Our Lfun scheme is summarised in Algorithm 1.
5.3.1 Learning from Detected Spam Tweets
LDT is used to deal with a classification scenario where there is a sufficiently robust
algorithm, but in lack of more data [95]. By learning from a large number of unlabelled
data, LDT can obtain sufficient new information, which can be used to update the
classification model.
In a LDT learning scenario, we are given a labelled data set Tl={(x1, y1), (x2, y2),
. . . , (xm, ym)}, containing m labelled tweets, where xi ∈ Rk(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) is the
feature vector of a tweet, yi ∈ {spam, non − spam} is the category label of a tweet.
We are also given a large data set Tu={xm+1, ym+1), (xm+2, ym+2), . . . , (xm+n, ym+n)}
containing n unlabelled tweets (n >> m). Then a classifier ϕ is trained by Tl. ϕ can
be used to divide Tu into spam Tspam and non-spam Tnon−spam. Labelled spam tweets
from Tu will be added into the labelled data set Tl to form a new training data set.
The basic of LDT is to find a function ϕ : Rk −→ {spam, non− spam} to predict
the label y ∈ {spam, non − spam} of new tweets when trained by Tl+spam, which is
the combination of the labelled data set Tl and spam tweets Tspam identified from
Tu. Particularly, the unlabelled data set Tu used in LDT does not have to share
the same distribution with the labelled data set Tl [52]. In addition, only detected
119
spam tweets will be added into the training data. The reason is that, we’ve already
gained sufficient information of non-spam tweets, as the statistical properties are not
changing for non-spam tweets. It is not necessary for us to gain more information
about non-spam tweets.
However, the spam tweets detected by the classifier that is trained using Tl also
have the same or similar distribution of old spam. We need samples from “changed
spam” to calibrate the classifier. We then use LHL (in Section 5.3.2) to get “changed
spam” samples.
5.3.2 Learning from Human Labelling
In a supervised spam detection system, a learning algorithm, such as Random Forest,
must be trained by sufficient labelled data to obtain more accurate detection results.
However, labelled instances are very expensive and time-consuming to obtain. Fortu-
nately, we have a huge number of unlabelled tweets which can be easily collected. The
LHL in our Lfun is best suited where there are numerous unlabelled data instances,
and human annotator anticipating to label many of them to train an accurate sys-
tem [103]. LHL aims to minimize the labelling cost by using different learning criteria
to select most informative samples from unlabelled data to be labelled by a human
annotator [145]. We also import active learning in our Lfun scheme.
Now let us define our learning component in a formal way. In supervised Twitter
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Algorithm 1 Lfun Algorithm
Require: labelled training set {ψ1, ..., ψN},
unlabelled tweets Tunlabelled,
a binary classification algorithm Φ,
Ensure: manually labelled selected tweets Tm
1: Tlabelled ←
⋃N
i=1 ψi
// Use Φ to create a classifier Cls from Tlabelled:
2: Cls← Φ : Tlabelled
// Tunlabelled is classified as Tspam and Tnon−spam:
3: Tspam + Tnon−spam ← Tunlabelled
// Merge spam tweets Tspam classified by Cls into Tlabelled:
4: Tex ← Tlabelled + Tspam
// use Tex to re-train the classifier Cls :
5: Cls← Φ : Tex
// determine the incoming tweet’s suitability for selection:
6: U ← ∅
7: for i = 1 to k do
8: if Ui meet the selection criteria S then
9: U ← (U ∪ Ui)
10: end if
11: end for
// manually labelling each ui in U
12: Tm ← ∅
13: for i = 1 to k do
14: manually label each ui
15: Tm ← (Tm ∪ ui)
16: end for
spam detection, we are given a labelled training data set Ttraining={(x1, y1), (x2, y2),
. . . , (xm, ym)}, containing m labelled tweets, where xi ∈ Rk(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) is the
feature vector of a tweet, yi ∈ {spam, non − spam} is the category label of a tweet.
The label yi of a tweet xi is donated as y = f(x). The task is then to learn a function
fˆ which can correctly classify a tweet to spam or non-spam. We use generalisation
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error to measure the accuracy of the learned function:
Error(fˆ) =
∑
x∈Ttraining
L
(
f(x), ˆf(x)
)
P (x).
In practice, f(x) is not available for testing data instances. Therefore, it is usual to
estimate the generalisation error by the test error:
Error(fˆ) =
∑
x∈Ttesting
L
(
f(x), ˆf(x)
)
P (x),
where Ttesting refers to the testing tweets, and prediction error can be measured by a
loss function L, such as mean squared error (MSE) [99]:
LMSE
(
f(x), ˆf(x)
)
=
(
f(x)− ˆf(x)
)2
.
The learning criteria is set to select the most useful instances Xselected and add them
to the training set Ttraining for achieving some certain objectives. Let us consider this
objective as the minimization of generation error of a learned function trained by
Ttraining. So the learning criteria can be donated as
Error(Ttraining ∪ {Xselected}).
The goal of this kind of learning is to select instances Xselected which can minimize
the generalisation error Error(Xselected):
argmin Error(Xselected).
As a result, good selection criteria must be estimated to minimize the error. In
Lfun scheme, we apply the selection criteria, called “Probability Threshold Filter
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Model”, to select the most informative tweets to tackle “Spam Drift”. In order to
achieve this, Random Forest (RF) is used to determine the probability of a tweet
whether it belongs to spam or not. Random Forest [19] can generate many classi-
fication trees after being trained with Tex from Asymmetric Self-Learning. When
classifying a new incoming tweet, each tree in the forest will give a class prediction.
Then forest chooses the classification result which has the most votes. In our case,
we set the number of trees to m, if n trees vote for the class “spam”, the probability
of the tweet to be classified as “spam” is Pr = n
m
.
Through our empirical study, the mis-classification mostly occurred when Pr ∈
[0.4, 0.7]. So we set the threshold τ to Pr ∈ [0.4, 0.7]. After we pre-filter some
candidate tweets to be labelled using the “Probability Threshold Filter Model”, the
number of tweets is still too many. We then randomly select a smaller number of
tweets from the candidate tweets (we set it to be 100 in our experiments) to be
manually labelled. As shown in Fig. 5.3, the manually labelled tweets, along with
Tex will be used to train a new classifier, which can tackle “Spam Drift” problem.
5.3.3 Performance Benefit Justification
We study the performance benefit of the proposed Lfun scheme by providing the
theoretical analysis in this section. Fig. 5.4 illustrates the performance benefit by
using simulation. We use three normal distributions (listed below) to simulate this: w0
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Figure 5.4: Performance Benefit Illustration
represents the distribution of non-spam, while w1 and w2 represents the distribution
of spam before and after using our Lfun approach, respectively.

w0 ∼ N(µ0, σ20)
w1 ∼ N(µ1, σ212)
w2 ∼ N(µ2, σ212)
The PDFs (probability distribution functions) [38] of these three distributions,
w0, w1 and w2 are illustrated as p0, p1 and p2 in Fig. 5.4. We assume that only the
mean µ1 of w1 changes to µ2, but the variance σ12 is not changing.
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Figure 5.5: Trend of Detection Rate
As p1 translated to p2, we can always find m, which can make
m− c2 = µ1 − µ2, (5.3.1)
and
p1(m) = p2(c2). (5.3.2)
As c2 < c1, we have
p0(c2) < p0(c1). (5.3.3)
We also have
p0(c1) = p1(c1), p0(c2) = p2(c2). (5.3.4)
From Equation. 5.3.3 and Equation. 5.3.4, we get
p1(c1) > p2(c2). (5.3.5)
From Equation. 5.3.2 and Equation. 5.3.5, we can have
p1(c1) > p1(m). (5.3.6)
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As a result,
m > c1. (5.3.7)
Taking into account Equation. 5.3.7 and Equation. 5.3.1, we can have c1 − c2 <
µ1 − µ2. So,
c2 − µ2 > c1 − µ1. (5.3.8)
The error rate of classification before Lfun,
P1(error) = P (x > c1) + P (x < c2)
=
∫ ∞
c1
p1(t)dt+
∫ c1
−∞
p0(t)dt
= 1− φ(c1 − µ1
σ12
) + φ(
c1 − µ0
σ0
).
Similarly, we have the error rate after using Lfun
P2(error) = 1− φ(c2 − µ2
σ12
) + φ(
c2 − µ0
σ0
).
The difference of P1(error) and P2(error),
P1(error)− P2(error)
=
[
φ( c2−µ2
σ12
)− φ( c1−µ1
σ12
)
]
+
[
φ( c1−µ0
σ0
)− φ( c2−µ0
σ0
)
]
,
(5.3.9)
while
φ(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2/2dt. (5.3.10)
The differentiation of Equation 5.3.10 is φ′(x) = 1√
2pi
e−x
2/2 > 0. So, we can have
φ(a) > φ(b) when a > b. From Equation. 5.3.8, we know c2−µ2
σ12
> c1−µ1
σ12
. Consequently,
φ(
c2 − µ2
σ12
) > φ(
c1 − µ1
σ12
). (5.3.11)
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As c1 > c2, we have
c1−µ0
σ0
> c2−µ0
σ0
. Then, we know
φ(
c1 − µ0
σ0
) > φ(
c2 − µ0
σ0
). (5.3.12)
Substitute Equation. 5.3.11 and 5.3.12 into 5.3.9, we will have
P1(error)− P2(error) > 0. (5.3.13)
Obviously, our proposed approach can effectively reduce the probability of error
from Equation 5.3.13.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed Lfun scheme in detecting
“drifted” Twitter spam. All the experiments are carried out on our real-world 10
consecutive days’ tweets with each day containing 100k spam tweets and 100k non-
spam tweets.
As in existing works [135], we also use F-measure and Detection Rate to measure
the performance. Despite that both of the metrics are used to evaluate all the classes’
performance, we only focus on the F-measure and Detection Rate of spam class. F-
measure is an evaluation metric which combines precision and recall to measure the
per-class performance of classification or detection algorithms. It can be calculated
by
F −measure = 2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
.
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Detection Rate is defined as the ratio of those tweets correctly classified as belonging
to class spam to the total number of tweets in class spam, it can be calculated by
DetectionRate =
TP
TP + FN
.
In the evaluation, we have designed three sets of experiments in order to show
the impact of spam drift (in Section 5.4.1) firstly, then the benefit of our proposed
Lfun (in Section 5.4.2) and the comparisons with other traditional machine learning
algorithms (in Section 5.4.3). We repeat the experiments for 100 times with different
random training samples and report the average values on all the 100 runs.
5.4.1 Impact of Spam Drift
In order to evaluate the impact of “Spam Drift” problem, we perform a number of
experiments in this section. It is aiming to show that the performance of a traditional
classifier, for example C4.5 Decision Tree, varies over time when “Spam Drift” exists.
During these experiments, Day 1 data is divided into two parts, half for training
pool where training data can be extracted from, and another half for testing purpose.
We create a classifier by using a supervised classification algorithm, and train it with
10k spam and 10k non-spam tweets which are randomly sampled from the training
pool of Day 1. Then the classifier is used to classify the testing data in Day1, as well
as the testing samples in Day 2 to Day 10.
Fig. 5.5 shows the Detection Rate of both spam and non-spam tweets on three
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classifiers, Random Forest, C4.5 Decision Tree and Bayes Network. We can see that,
the Detection Rate of non-spam is very stable, it keeps above 90% for Random Forest
and C4.5 Decision Tree, and near 90% for Bayes Network, despite the change of
testing data. However, when it comes to spam tweets, the Detection Rate fluctuates
dramatically, and the overall trend is decreasing. The Detection Rates for Random
Forest and C4.5 Decision Tree are 90% in the first day, but they could decrease to
less then 40% in the 9th day. This phenomenon also applies with Bayes Network, the
Detection Rate decreases from 70% on 1st day to less than 50% for most of the other
testing days.
5.4.2 Performance of Lfun
We evaluate the performance of Lfun here, by using F-measure and Detection Rate.
The number labelled training samples from old day (i.e. Day 1 and Day 2 in this
case) is 5000. The number of manually labelled samples during Lfun is set to 100.
Fig. 5.6 shows the Detection Rate of Lfun, when Day 1 data (Fig. 5.6a) or Day
2 data (Fig. 5.6b) is used for training and the rest days are used for testing. We can
see from Fig. 5.6a that, the Detection Rates of original Random Forest are relatively
low. For example, the Detection Rate when testing on Day 9 is only around 40%.
However, our RF-Lfun can reach over 90% Detection Rate on the same day. While
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Figure 5.6: Detection Rate of Lfun
Random Forest can only achieve Detection Rate ranging from 45% to 80%, our RF-
Lfun can rise as high as 90% Detection Rate. This also happens when training data
is from Day 2, and testing data is from Day 3 to Day 10, as illustrated in Fig. 5.6b.
The highest Detection Rate of Random Forest is around 85%, but that of RF-Lfun is
over 95%. Generally, our Lfun can detect most of the spam tweets even with “Spam
Drift”. The reason is that, our Lfun brings more samples of “changed spam tweets”
to update the training process.
Fig. 5.7 shows the F-measure of Random Forest using Lfun approach compared
with it without using Lfun. We can see that, the F-measure of original Random Forest
keeps decreasing from 80% to 55% as the testing data changes from Day 2 to Day
9 in Fig. 5.7a. However, once it is applied with our Lfun approach, the F-measure
becomes stable, which is always greater than 80%, except on Day 8. Similarly, when
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Figure 5.7: F-measure of Lfun
the training data is from Day 2, F-measure of Random Forest is decreasing as well.
But F-measure of our Lfun-RF is not fluctuating, as shown in Fig. 5.7b. Nevertheless,
the proposed Lfun can effectively improve the F-measure and the improvement is up
to 25% in the best case.
5.4.3 Comparisons with other Algorithms
In this section, we compare our Lfun approach with four traditional machine learning
algorithms (Random Forest, C4.5 Decision Tree, Bayes Network and SVM ) to detect
spam tweets in the “drift” scenario. There are two sets of experiments carried out.
One set is to evaluate the performance while training data is from Day 1, and testing
data are varying from Day 2 to Day 9. Another set is to evaluate the performance
when training and testing data are from two specified days, but the number of labelled
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Figure 5.8: Comparisons with other Algorithms (changing testing days)
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Figure 5.9: Comparisons with other Algorithms (training on Day 1 and testing on
Day 5)
training data is changing from 1000 to 10000.
5.4.3.1 Comparisons with Changing Days
Fig. 5.8 demonstrates the experimental results in terms of overall accuracy, F-measure
and detection rate of Lfun compared to other algorithms, when the testing days are
varying. We can see from Fig. 5.8a that, the overall accuracy of Lfun outperforms all
the other algorithms, followed by Random Forest, C4.5 Decision Tree, Bayes Network
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Figure 5.10: Comparisons with other Algorithms (training on Day 4 and testing on
Day 8)
and SVM. In terms of F-measure (see Fig. 5.8b), our Lfun is also the best among
all the algorithms. For example, it is over 30% higher than C4.5 Decision Tree when
testing data is from Day 9. Furthermore, the performance of Lfun is much better
in terms of detection rate. Fig. 5.8c show that, the detection rate of Lfun is above
90% for most of the days. However, the detection rate of all the others is below
80%. Especially, Bayes Network has the lowest detection rate, which is below 50%.
In general, our Lfun is the best among all the algorithms evaluated by all the three
metrics.
5.4.3.2 Comparisons with Changing Labelled Training Samples
Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.10 report the evaluation results when the number of labelled
training samples is changing. The training and testing data is from Day 1 and Day
5 in Fig. 5.9, while the training and testing data is from Day 4 and Day 8 in Fig.
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5.10. We can see that the overall accuracy of Lfun increases from 70% to 80% with
the increase of labelled training samples. It is better than the four algorithms in
comparison, as the best of them (C4.5 Decision Tree) can only achieve less than 74%
overall accuracy. When it comes to F-measure, the performance of Lfun is still the
best; it is 10% higher than that of C4.5 Decision Tree and nearly 30% higher than
that of SVM. In terms of detection rate, our Lfun is about 30% higher than the second
best algorithm. Similarly in Fig. 5.10, Lfun outperforms all the other algorithms.
5.5 Discussions
In research community, there are also some machine learning approaches related to
our proposed method. For example, online learning and incremental learning. They
are both common machine learning algorithms to continuously update the prediction
model with new training data for better future classification. They can generate a
prediction model and put it into operation without much training data at first, but
they require new training data to update the model. When it comes to online Twitter
spam classification, it is very difficult to label enough training samples to update the
model. The reasons are two-folds. Firstly, it is significantly time-consuming to label
a large amount of tweets by human. Secondly, it is difficult to gain enough spam
tweets even we have got a large number of human-labelled tweets, as the spam rate
of Twitter is about 5% [29]. If there are not enough spam samples (Lfun does not
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need non-spam samples as non-spam tweets are not drifting) to retrain the model, it
is not able to solve the “spam drift” issue.
Our Lfun approach has the same advantage of online learning and incremental
learning, i.e., it can be deployed without much training data at the beginning, but
to be updated when new training data comes. Different to online and incremental
learning, we incorporate both automated labelling and human labelling. The LDT
component learns from the detected tweets. This competent is automatically updated
with detected spam tweets with no human effort. To better adjust the prediction
model, we also import LHL component, which learns from human labelling. To
minimize human effort, LHL only samples a very small number of tweets for labelling,
for example, 100 tweets in our experiments. In addition, it does not randomly pick up
tweets to label, but to be in line with selection criteria called “Probability Threshold
Filter Model” which can choose the most useful tweets. Benefiting from these two
components, our Lfun approach can successfully deal with “spam drift”, but with the
least human effort.
5.6 Summary
In this paper, we firstly identify the “Spam Drift” problem in statistical features
based Twitter spam detection. In order to solve this problem, we propose a Lfun
approach. In our Lfun scheme, classifiers will be re-trained by the added “changed
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spam” tweets which are learnt from unlabelled samples, thus it can reduce the impact
of “Spam Drift” significantly. We evaluate the performance of Lfun approach in terms
of Detection Rate and F-measure. Experimental results show that both detection rate
and F-measure are improved a lot when applying with our Lfun approach. We also
compare Lfun to four traditional machine learning algorithms, and find that our Lfun
outperforms all four algorithms in terms of overall accuracy, F-measure and Detection
Rate.
There is also a limitation in our Lfun scheme. The benefit of “old” labelled spam
is to eliminate the impact of “spam drift” to classify more accurate spam tweets in
future days. The effectiveness of “old” spam has been proved by our experiments
during a short period. However, the effectiveness will decrease as the correlation
of “very old” spam becomes less with the new spam in the long term run. In the
future, we will incorporate incremental adjustment to adjust the training data, such
as dropping the “too old” samples after a certain time. It can not only eliminate
unuseful information in the training data but also make it faster to train the model
as the number of training samples decrease.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
Online Social Networks have reshaped the way of communications and information
retrieval for individuals’ daily life. The popularity of OSNs not only attracts legit-
imate users, but also spammers, who mainly spread unsolicited posts (in the form
of tweets or updates) containing malicious links that directs victims to external sites
containing malware downloads, phishing, drug sales, scams and so on. Due to the
higher successful rate of victims to click malicious links compared to email, more and
more spammers leverage OSNs to distribute spam. Such spam not only pollute the
platforms but also exploit users’ critical information.
To tackle this challenge, we begin with a through data analysis of spam on Twit-
ter. We demonstrate that various deceptive content of spam performs differently
in luring victims to malicious sites and the regional response rate to various Twitter
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spam outbreaks varies greatly. In addition, spammers are becoming “smarter” by em-
ploying more complex spamming strategies to avoid being detected. We then carry
out a performance evaluation of machine learning based streaming spam detection
approaches, which is from three different aspects of data, feature and model. We,
therefore, identified an unseen issue in Twitter spam detection, i.e. “Spam Drift”.
We, thus, develop Lfun approach to address “Spam Drift” problem. Our Lfun
approach contains both automated labelling and human labelling. The LDT compo-
nent learns from the detected tweets. This competent is automatically updated with
detected spam tweets with no human effort. To better adjust the prediction model,
we also import LHL component, which learns from human labelling. By combining
them together, our approach can deal with “Spam Drift”.
The key value of carrying out an depth analysis of Twitter spam and thorough
evaluation of streaming spam detection mechanisms is to expose current flaws in
Twitter spam detection area. Thus, we can overcome the shortcomings and implement
an effective and long-term detection system. We summarise our most important
findings and proposed solution here for the social spam research community.
• Better Understanding of Twitter Spam: After analysing around 600 mil-
lion of spam tweets, we find various deceptive information of spam performs
differently in luring victims to malicious sites. In addition, the regional dis-
tribution of victims varies due to different types of deceptive information. We
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have also identified three new spamming strategies applied by spammers.
• Evaluating Streaming Spam Detection Schemes: We evaluate the impact
of different factors to performance the streaming spam detection, which include
spam to non-spam ratio, feature discretization, training data size, data sam-
pling, time-related data, and machine learning algorithms. The results show
the streaming spam tweet detection is still a big challenge and a robust detec-
tion technique should take into account the three aspects of data, feature and
model.
• Address of Unseen “Spam Drift” Problem: We firstly identify the “Spam
Drift” issue in detecting Twitter spam. We then propose a Lfun scheme which
can discover “changed” spam tweets from unlabelled tweets and incorporate
them into classifier’s training process. Our Lfun scheme can effectively detect
spam tweets even when they are drifting.
6.2 Future Work
In this thesis, we provide insights on deceptive information contained in spam tweets
and emerging spamming strategies. We also firstly identify and solve the “Spam
Drift” issue. However, the war between researchers and spammers is never ending.
There are a couple of future works can be considered.
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6.2.1 Improvement of Our Lfun Scheme
We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of our Lfun scheme in this thesis. How-
ever, there is also a limitation in our proposed Lfun approach. The benefit of “old”
labelled spam is to eliminate the impact of “Spam Drift”, so as to identify more ac-
curate spam tweets in future days. The effectiveness of “old” spam has been proved
by our experiments during a short period. However, the effectiveness will decrease as
the correlation of “very old” spam becomes less with the new spam in the long term
run. In the future, we will incorporate incremental adjustment to adjust the training
data, such as dropping the “too old” samples after a certain time. It can not only
eliminate useless information in the training data but also make it faster to train the
model as the number of training samples decrease.
Also, the main reason causes “Spam Drift” is that the changing of statistical fea-
tures. How about we do not use statistical features? This issue will then be avoided.
Deep Learning recently has shown its super power in dealing with unstructured data,
such as video, image, text and audio. There has not been any works to use deep learn-
ing to solve Twitter spam issue. We can employ deep learning techniques to solve
social spam problems in the future. As tweet itself contains a lot of information,
Natural Language Processing techniques are also promising in this field.
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6.2.2 Operational Deployment, NLP, and Deep Learning for
Twitter Spam Detection
Operational deployment should be one concern of spam detection on OSNs. Real-
world applications of social spam detection need to work online, reporting live infor-
mation or trigger mitigations according to detection results. Online detection requires
trade-offs between performance and accuracy. However, most of the current works
are testing oﬄine and using a small set of data set. As Twitter is seeing more than
500 million tweets a day, the operational deployment is a challenging area to work
on.
How do human beings determine whether a tweet is spam or not? Yes, through
reading and understanding the semantic meaning. Natural Language Processing
(NLP) has demonstrated its success in machine translation, question answering sys-
tems, as well as filtering email spam. Due to the difference of text length among
email (up to hundreds of words) and tweet (at most 140 characters), NLP’s success in
filtering email spam cannot be simply copied to fight with Twitter spam. However, it
is very promising to use NLP to detect Twitter spam since we can also use semantic
meaning to infer spam.
Deep learning is becoming extremely hot in research community. Researchers
have applied deep neural nets to hand-writing recognition, voice recognition, object
detection in images, as well as text understanding. How can we leverage deep learning
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algorithms to detect Twitter spam? It is really a good working area.
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